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WWII history and tactics

Uncle Fester

Robot Pimp
None
Super Moderator
Contributor
I've heard of but haven't read Shattered Sword - I'll add it to the list. Fighters chewed up torpedo bombers on both sides. The Kates were effective until the USN got their shit together with regards to fighter direction, and got better fighters to go along with it. And Yamato and Musashi had no CAP by the time they were getting torpedoes tossed at them. Your point about the American torpedoes goes along with my overall argument - the US started the war with technology and tactics that did not stand up to a real war against a peer competitor.

In another example, for reasons of shiphandling and damage repair, the US prewar had decided to armor the main deck (ie, hangar deck) of their carriers, not the flight deck. The British had armored flight decks, and the British carriers that entered the Pacific War in 1944-45 were shrugging off kamikaze hits that were completely disabling US carriers.

The problem isn't willingness to war game, then or now. The Fleet Problems were for the most part creative and robust exercises that exposed real weakness in US doctrine and tactics - the vulnerability of anchorages to carrier air attack, for example. The participants had much more latitude than a CAG would have at Air Wing Fallon today. Then as now, it's for nothing if you're not willing to honestly assess and implement the lessons of those games.
 

Pags

N/A
pilot
I've heard of but haven't read Shattered Sword - I'll add it to the list. Fighters chewed up torpedo bombers on both sides. The Kates were effective until the USN got their shit together with regards to fighter direction, and got better fighters to go along with it. And Yamato and Musashi had no CAP by the time they were getting torpedoes tossed at them. Your point about the American torpedoes goes along with my overall argument - the US started the war with technology and tactics that did not stand up to a real war against a peer competitor.

In another example, for reasons of shiphandling and damage repair, the US prewar had decided to armor the main deck (ie, hangar deck) of their carriers, not the flight deck. The British had armored flight decks, and the British carriers that entered the Pacific War in 1944-45 were shrugging off kamikaze hits that were completely disabling US carriers.

The problem isn't willingness to war game, then or now. The Fleet Problems were for the most part creative and robust exercises that exposed real weakness in US doctrine and tactics - the vulnerability of anchorages to carrier air attack, for example. The participants had much more latitude than a CAG would have at Air Wing Fallon today. Then as now, it's for nothing if you're not willing to honestly assess and implement the lessons of those games.
I'd HIGHLY recommend shattered sword. A very in-depth analysis of midway told from the IJN side. Even goes so far as to discuss the finer points of IJN carrier doctrine to include elevator cycles.
 

Treetop Flyer

Well-Known Member
pilot
The Marines really started thinking about large-scale amphibious assault in the 30s, based on their experiences with interventions in Central America and the Caribbean. But the first landings in the Pacific (Maikin Island and Tarawa, for example) were very nearly disasters, and they learned the importance of beach reconnaissance, among other things. And despite all that, when the Army began planning for its assaults in Europe and North Africa, there were precisely zero Marines on the planning staff.
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Guadalcanal was only three months before North Africa. The invasions of Sicily (10 July 1943) and Italy (September 1943) both took place before Tarawa and Makin Island (both 20 November 1943).
 

jmcquate

Well-Known Member
Contributor
The use of proximity fuses (not used in the European theater) and a superior damage control procedures along with far superior radar and our cryptography advantage did wonders in the Pacific. Japan should have been defeated a year earlier if it wasn't for the "Europe first" strategy adopted by the Allies to keep the Soviets in the war.
 

Pags

N/A
pilot
The use of proximity fuses (not used in the European theater) and a superior damage control procedures along with far superior radar and our cryptography advantage did wonders in the Pacific. Japan should have been defeated a year earlier if it wasn't for the "Europe first" strategy adopted by the Allies to keep the Soviets in the war.
By the end of the war the USN was a technological generation ahead of the IJN in pretty much every area.
 

Pags

N/A
pilot
From the other side in WW II. I caught most of this movie on the Tokyo - Atlanta flight. Movie is called "The Admiral" and it came out in 2011.

Have to check it out. I'd also like to see the japanese movie about the Yamato and Operation Ten Go.
 

Hotdogs

I don’t care if I hurt your feelings
pilot
I
The Marines really started thinking about large-scale amphibious assault in the 30s, based on their experiences with interventions in Central America and the Caribbean. But the first landings in the Pacific (Maikin Island and Tarawa, for example) were very nearly disasters, and they learned the importance of beach reconnaissance, among other things. And despite all that, when the Army began planning for its assaults in Europe and North Africa, there were precisely zero Marines on the planning staff.

Not to beat a drum but I would say that a good portion of the Marines' lessons were taken from the Brit and Allies during the landings at Gallipoli during WWI (A lot of which had to do with C2), and the 30s was the era for the development of the equipment (Amphibious tractors, Attack Transports, Landing platforms) and large scale exercises that led to what we saw in WWII. Towards the end of the Pacific war, the Corps was planning and executing division sized amphibious operations like it was nothing. We preach we have a 2 MEB amphibious capability, but I doubt it would could run anything above a MEB with out running into significant friction.
 

MIDNJAC

is clara ship
pilot
If we think that engaging a peer competitor in War at Sea or any other area won't result in high losses than we do indeed have Victory Disease.

And while we talk about such a fight, I think the part we don't talk about much is the nuclear holocaust that would ensue for our families back home, hours after our own deaths.
 

Flash

SEVAL/ECMO
None
Super Moderator
Contributor
And while we talk about such a fight, I think the part we don't talk about much is the nuclear holocaust that would ensue for our families back home, hours after our own deaths.

Nukes wouldn't have to be involved, especially if the war had limited objectives like taking back a 'breakaway province' and you had a lot less nukes than your enemy (yes, it does become a factor).
 

Randy Daytona

Cold War Relic
pilot
Super Moderator
I've heard of but haven't read Shattered Sword - I'll add it to the list. Fighters chewed up torpedo bombers on both sides. The Kates were effective until the USN got their shit together with regards to fighter direction, and got better fighters to go along with it. And Yamato and Musashi had no CAP by the time they were getting torpedoes tossed at them.

They (financed by Paul Allen) found the Musashi today after years of searching. http://www.washingtonpost.com/postt...088a82-e233-4b1c-8214-efb2602fb5fa_video.html

It took 19 torpedoes and 17 bombs before going down. 19 and 17.
 

Pags

N/A
pilot
View attachment 14541
Here's a piece of Yamato's armor after a 16" naval gun test. That's some thick armor.
Iowa class BBs vs Yamato BBs are one of the big "what ifs" of the Pacific War. When Yamato sorties to Oki for Ten Go the US fleet considered sending their BBs out to attack Yamato but this plan was overruled in favor of aircraft.
 

jmcquate

Well-Known Member
Contributor
Iowa class BBs vs Yamato BBs are one of the big "what ifs" of the Pacific War. When Yamato sorties to Oki for Ten Go the US fleet considered sending their BBs out to attack Yamato but this plan was overruled in favor of aircraft.
And a good thing it was. BBs were made obsolete on 12/08/1941 (except for shore bombardment). The classic showdown of massive battle wagons squaring off was nostalgic Naval thinking (crossing the tee and all that).
 
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