So I was talking EMCON the other day and I got to thinking about whether or not TF-38/58 routinely practiced EMCON during World War Two. I know both fleets regularly used radio silence to conceal their movements, but was EMCON used tactically to prevent Japanese forces from fixing the exact location the TGs? Or did the Japanese not have an ability to detect USN radar emissions and find/fix off of them? I've never seen a discussion on limited radiation of air or surface search radars by the USN which leads me to believe that the USN routinely operated with their radars radiating especially later in the war when the kamikzae threat was greatest. Along the same thought, I don't think I've ever heard of either the USN or IJN/IJA using chaff or other ECM during the conflict as was common during the air war in the ETO. Anyone have any insight into this corner of history?
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TF-38/58 EMCON and Japanese EW/ELINT?
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I thought of the same thing as well. My understanding is that CAP was airborne during daylight hours and that USN doctrine called for radar direction of the CAP by a controlling radar vessel. This would seem to imply that the radars were on. Even during earlier battles it was common for US ships to detect incoming raids via radar. Fighter direction during these battles wasn't as developed and the CAP wasn't always sufficient but it seems that the detection happened early. If the Japanese had had a way to find the US via radar emissions I can think of a few cases where they may have found the US fleet earlier. Instead I think most Japanese airborne searches were visual even to the end of the war. I don't know if they ever fielded an airborne radar.
Little ELINT that I am aware of, mainly just as an warning tool more than anything else. I seem to remember that the Japanese could pick up US sub radar transmissions (I seem to remember a Japanese account of the shadowing and sinking of the Shinano by the USS Archerfish that mentions it, Edit: Found an account that mentions the Japanese picking up the sub's radar) but that was used just for awareness and not locating from what I know.
The Japanese were far behind the other major powers with radar in the first place so they were at a disadvantage there. They did have some by the end of the war but they didn't have many and they were far behind the ones the Alies and the Germans used. Given the distances and the less powerful radars of the day the discipline of ELINT didn't really develop to what we think of it today until the 50's. What the Allies did use in the Atlantic was HF DF'ing against the U-boats but that was not as well developed and just gave general instead of precise locations.
The Japanese were far behind the other major powers with radar in the first place so they were at a disadvantage there. They did have some by the end of the war but they didn't have many and they were far behind the ones the Alies and the Germans used. Given the distances and the less powerful radars of the day the discipline of ELINT didn't really develop to what we think of it today until the 50's. What the Allies did use in the Atlantic was HF DF'ing against the U-boats but that was not as well developed and just gave general instead of precise locations.
There were several occasions during Okinawa where Japanese bombers were evidently homing in on US radars during their night raids, targeting the radar picket ships. Similarly, both sides routinely listened in on the others' fighter-direction networks. Simple radio jamming was used by all sides. Everyone was aware of the eavesdropping and direction-finding problem, but there wasn't much they could do about it, beyond code words, base numbers, and comm discipline. The tech for covered voice comms and spread-spectrum wasn't mature until the 70s. Apparently Hedy Lamarr invented workable frequency hopping during WWII, but the Navy wasn't interested.
Got any good references for those, this thread has intrigued me to look into it a little more.
German U-boats had radar warning to some degree, according to Wikipedia, and we all know Wikipedia is always right
WWII EW/ELINT has to be looked at what at the time would be a macro/micro level. EW/ELINT was codebreaking, and we were very good at that. Individual ship, aircraft stuff was done on the fly. Our airborne radars were rudimentary, the ships a a lot better. The Japaneses radar was.........well not a factor. Radio silence was imposed to prevent basic intercept of unencrypted comms, to ADF location findings. Look at the ETO, in particular the RAF Bomber Commands campaign for the real origins.
So I've done some digging and found a few sites on the internet where there was some discussion on Japanese radar capabilities. Most of the information comes from the reports generated by the US Naval Technical Mission to Japan. A brief synopsis is that the Japanese radar was well behind the radars of the other powers and that there was no central effort to catch up; due to the nature of Japan's Army and Navy rivalry efforts were often duplicated. There were early attempts by Japan to exploit allied technology; I read that they sent divers down to Repulse and Prince of Wales to capture the technology after those vessels had been sunk. When the USMC captured a Japanese air search radar on Guadacanal, US operators were unimpressed with it as it was comparable to obsolete US tech (CXAM).
I haven't been able to find any references to the Japanese using USN emissions to find surface units.
The USAAF also used EW to great effect during the bombing of Japan. EW B-29s known as Porcupines (because of all of the antennas) would actively jam japanese air search and FC radars making them, in many cases, ineffective.
I also found this guy on the web that some of you VAQ guys may find historically interesting:
I haven't been able to find any references to the Japanese using USN emissions to find surface units.
The USAAF also used EW to great effect during the bombing of Japan. EW B-29s known as Porcupines (because of all of the antennas) would actively jam japanese air search and FC radars making them, in many cases, ineffective.
I also found this guy on the web that some of you VAQ guys may find historically interesting:
Fascinating. I guess the Hertz hadn't yet attained widespread acceptance in nerd-speak circles. Also interesting that the Germans stayed at the lower band of the spectrum, while the Js used the higher microwave region. Would have been cool to see some of the technical specs on this equipment. I read a really cool book years ago that talks about the history of U.S. carrier-based aviation, and it spends a good amount of time talking about the various electronic gadgets that were used and how radar/TACAN/ADF/Etc were first incorporated into tactical platforms.
I was off down the Wikipedia rabbit hole the other day and came across and interesting tidbit that while not germane to EW and ECM was relevant to the Pacific War.
I was aware that towards the end of the war that the IJN's fleet anchorage was Lingga Roads in modern Indonesia and that the fleet was kept here to be closer to the oil fields since it was so hard to get the oil from SE Asia to Japan. What I didn't know was that prior to The Battle of the Phillipine Sea the carriers refueled with unrefined crude oil. Apparently unrefined crude creates more volatile vapors and this, coupled with the IJN's poor DC practices, contributed to the loss of the carriers Taiho, Shokaku, and Hiyo.
I was aware that towards the end of the war that the IJN's fleet anchorage was Lingga Roads in modern Indonesia and that the fleet was kept here to be closer to the oil fields since it was so hard to get the oil from SE Asia to Japan. What I didn't know was that prior to The Battle of the Phillipine Sea the carriers refueled with unrefined crude oil. Apparently unrefined crude creates more volatile vapors and this, coupled with the IJN's poor DC practices, contributed to the loss of the carriers Taiho, Shokaku, and Hiyo.