During my nugget cruise my roomate (from Bowie, MD) would play the Greeseman every morning on the "boom box" in our stateroom. His mom would send him casette tapes recorded daily. Hilarious. I was annoyed at first but caught on to the hilarity.
-
Please take a moment and update your account profile. If you have an updated account profile with basic information on why you are on Air Warriors it will help other people respond to your posts. How do you update your profile you ask?
Go here:
Edit Account Details and Profile
Solving the Navy's problems one RC squadron at a time
- Thread starter red_stang65
- Start date
I'm 12 years late with this joke, but I can't help myself...
You guys didn't fall for it did you?
Class A x 2.
Mid air collision in 1993. All 4 crew ejected ok (2 Intruders).
Tailpipe failure Resulting in fire while in tension on cat. Aircraft struck..
You guys didn't fall for it did you?
Late on the reply to this and by no means an impartial judge on the matter, but I think that's a narrow perspective on the role that 209 plays. 209 supports exercise like Red Flag, the Neptunes, and also supports the VFCs during SFARP. Our jets are the only AESA radars in the TSW inventory which is an important consideration for VFC support (and is a reason that they ask for our support). Flying in those other high visibility exercises also reduces the burden on the active component and allows them to get a break during their maintenance phase as opposed to being continually run ragged. It's great training for us too. Plus our INDOPACOM deployment was closer to 4 months. That is a pedantic point and yes it is shorter than the AC. The squadron is also making a concerted effort to shed the flying club reputation. To that end, it's becoming a repository for every patch getting off active duty.
Could the squadron be better utilized? Ya probably. Using different order types (i.e. not always mob-ing) is one approach that elicits strong opinions. From what I gather, 209 was heavily utilized in the 00's so there is a precedent. I would argue that our squadron is better utilized than some other assets in the reserve (F-5s out of New Orleans comes to mind) and serves an important role. Plus to your point it is augmenting the fleet and filling AC gaps. Moreover, the talent retention aspect is pretty important element. The Navy has spent beaucoup dollars training us, so why not continue to retain that capability in the reserves. Does that translate into an uber-squadron? Probably not. But I think you're being overly generous in describing an AC squadron as a repository of tactical prowess, particularly at the O-4+ level.
With an eye to the balloon going up, that effort is going to require a level of manpower that I think is hard to comprehend. Getting rid of 209 (or similar operational capabilities) doesn't directly translate into increased AC capability, particularly in this retention environment. So more is better in my opinion.
All of those examples of utilization are great, and totally agree with your last point about the “all hands on deck” requirement we’re likely to expect. Too bad none of that was considered prior to this decision:
Navy Proposes Divestment of Special Ops Helicopter Squadron - Seapower
ARLINGTON, Va. — The U.S. Navy is proposing to retire its only expeditionary helicopter squadron dedicated to support of special operations forces with the service’s 2023 budget request. Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron 85 (HSC-85), a reserve squadron based at Naval...
seapowermagazine.org
Big Navy has been gunning to shutdown this squadron for years. It's definitely a loss of capability and the mission set has been discussed at length. Ultimately bean counters made the call.All of those examples of utilization are great, and totally agree with your last point about the “all hands on deck” requirement we’re likely to expect. Too bad none of that was considered prior to this decision:
Navy Proposes Divestment of Special Ops Helicopter Squadron - Seapower
ARLINGTON, Va. — The U.S. Navy is proposing to retire its only expeditionary helicopter squadron dedicated to support of special operations forces with the service’s 2023 budget request. Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron 85 (HSC-85), a reserve squadron based at Naval...
It did not help the cause to have the HH-60W defined as having organic Maritime deployment capability as part of its core requirements.
Considering USAF reduced their purchase from +100 down to the mid-70s, the Whiskey never factored into the conversation about CNAFR end strength.
The AF rescue units are training - and have been - to deploy from Navy decks for extended periods to support joint air campaign operations. Single spot decks, amphibs, LHD, CVN as well as expeditionary barge /sea base. To support AF, USN and USMC air ops.The W will be the tool of choice for non-permissive rescue/recovery/PR of AF, Navy, or Marine aircrew. And for significantly longer range ops, CV-22B.
While there certainly have been one off demos of this capability (at least with CV-22), I wasn’t under the impression that this was something that USAF rescue units typically trained to, especially for extended periods. Do you have any examples of it?
Kinda missing the point- HSC-85 primary mission is SOF not traditional CSAR. The discussion should be more centered on EABO and the loss of that capability and capacity to covertly move people to islands or IVO islands and operate from an austere location with a light footprint. That is not easy to do and there wI’ll be a ton of lost knowledge once the doors close.
Don’t know much about the W, but my guess is that it isn’t very maritime deployment capable. USAF just said that to get the cash they needed.
Yeah, @ChuckMK23 you keep coming at this from a capabilities stand point, but that's not what this was about. And it's not just CNAFR that suffered. When I had lunch a year and a half ago with one of the dudes that's in the front office of MSW now, he said it boiled down to CNAF needing money. The reason I kept hearing from both the AC side and the RC side was the F-35, but red_stang65 is probably closer to that than I would know now.
Because CNAF needed the money, they started cutting costs. That included getting rid of a lot of the MSW rotary pieces (units, billets, etc), but it also included cutting funding for parts on the AC side, causing everyone to have PMC airframes on the line. Hell, HSM-41 would have 30 airframes on the line and the only ones that were FMC were the three Indian birds (who usually break every other day anyway, they're just able to get parts).
Does this result in a capabilities loss on the RC side, especially within MSW? Absolutely, but at the end of the day, no bucks, no Buck Rogers.
Yeah, I'd say there's a notable difference between Maritime employable and maritime deployable. There's a reason Seahawks have blade fold, 401x vice 701x engines, etc. Refueling, embarking SOF, or even spending a week on an ESB is a lot easier than months on a surface combatant. The ways in which a 60S isn't like a 60B,F,H,R have already shown themselves to be limiters in maritime deployment.
Now I want to know more too. The only difference I'm pretty sure about is compressor blade coating on the 401s to better protect against salt spray. We're working 401D stuff now, so it's a perfect time to ask the T700 team - Google doesn't have much.