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Marines aim to avoid postwar identity crisis
- Thread starter joe dirt
- Start date
I do...but I accidentally submitted it before typing my comments.
I'm happy to see Gen. Amos laying the groundwork for the Marine Corps as things seem to be winding down in Afghanistan. It is important, especially since in recent years we've been considered by many to be a second land army and we need to move back to our expeditionary roots.
I'm happy to see Gen. Amos laying the groundwork for the Marine Corps as things seem to be winding down in Afghanistan. It is important, especially since in recent years we've been considered by many to be a second land army and we need to move back to our expeditionary roots.
I'll submit that we've never lost our "expeditionary roots"; while the OIF/OEF rotations have gotten most of the press, we've still maintained a MEU presence. Are there Marines who have never done any of that Navy stuff? Absolutely. There are also plenty of Marines who haven't done any of the pure OIF/OEF rotations, as well.
IMO, our biggest challenges will rest in balancing our nation's expeditionary needs with its limited Amphib assets. The LHDs are going to get old quickly (Wasp is nearly a quarter of a century old already!), and the San Antionio-class hasn't proven to be the most reliable boats ever built (nor the most cost-effective, but I don't want to get my blood boiling over billion-dollar LPDs!).
On top of that, the America-class LHA is going to bring us back to our LPH days (no well deck), so we're going to have to figure out air-only movements from our big-deck Amphibs...and broke-dick LCU or maybe LCAC surface movements from the LPDs and LSDs, since we pissed so much money away on the EFV with nothing to show for it.
We've got a lot of work to do, but honestly, we've been through worse in our history. We'll figure it out.
Good times!
IMO, our biggest challenges will rest in balancing our nation's expeditionary needs with its limited Amphib assets. The LHDs are going to get old quickly (Wasp is nearly a quarter of a century old already!), and the San Antionio-class hasn't proven to be the most reliable boats ever built (nor the most cost-effective, but I don't want to get my blood boiling over billion-dollar LPDs!).
On top of that, the America-class LHA is going to bring us back to our LPH days (no well deck), so we're going to have to figure out air-only movements from our big-deck Amphibs...and broke-dick LCU or maybe LCAC surface movements from the LPDs and LSDs, since we pissed so much money away on the EFV with nothing to show for it.
We've got a lot of work to do, but honestly, we've been through worse in our history. We'll figure it out.
Good times!
I agree that we never lost our expeditionary roots, but we certainly strayed from our mission. As an amtracker, we focused our time stateside training not to land the surface assault element of the landing force, but to act as a provisional rifle platoon/company. I understand that every Marine is a rifleman, but what good is a rifleman in an amphibious assault if they cannot get to shore when they are supposed to? For me at least, it seems like The Corps intends to more time and money on enhancing our amphibious capabilities (Assault Amphibian Vehicle Service Life Extension). Just my thoughts from the outside looking in though.
Huh?
While the MEUs have been considered a bummer for the past 10 years, they really do represent the historical role, and also the future of the Marine Corps. Being a small, rapidly deployable force that brings its own air and fire support seems to me to be very relevant to the future. In contrast to the Army's most visible rapid reaction force, the 82nd Airborne, a MEU that brings r/w and f/w air, armor, and artillery, all on short notice is a huge asset. Small wars and contingencies are what we do, from the Barbary pirates to the Somali pirates and everything in-between. If, as Sec'y Gates said, any President that gets involved in another land war in Asia needs his head examined, these will be more prevalent, not less. As the article implied, the Pacific Rim is because more important. Look at a map of the region. It appears to have a lot of water, doesn't it? All these stories about the Corps losing relevance seem ridiculous to me.
As you look at missions like theater security cooperation, the MEU is your best bang for the buck. We can go into any given area and do a training exercise, a real world humanitarian mission, and it works both to enable the country we are working with to better provide their own security and avoid us having to go in later to fix problems that may arise, or it builds good will between us such that we may be able to partner with them later or merely use their airspace when needed for actions again a neighbor.
Our supposed identity crisis is self induced. For example, we bet the farm on the JSF, and VSTOL capability. Seems to me the Marine Corps had a long and illustrious history of both maritime service and aviation service before 1985 when it got the Harrier.
We seem to have hinged our unique capability on the EFV and the JSF, both rediculously expensive and very mission specific, and as both are cut and face the chopping block, respectively, we lose our reason for being. As opposed to hinging our unique capability on the amphibious/expeditionary/maritime missions that are independent of a specific piece of equipment. Sure equipment is an enabler to those missions, but should not rely on it entirely.
If you've ever worked with the Army, and seen how they roll, ie, the massive ass behind them in the form of log trains, field kitchens, huge tents with heat and a/c, facilities, etc, etc, etc, the Marine Corps is in no way a second land army. If someone accuses of that, the better answer is to educate them on the difference between the two rather than asking for billion dollar projects to make us appear more different. I spent OIF 1 operating at a land based field with AM2 matting, sleeping on a cot in a tent with no a/c, using porta shitters, and somehow managed to make it work. The days of working on concrete, sleeping on a real bed in a can or swa hut with a/c and flush toilets came much later.
Our supposed identity crisis is self induced. For example, we bet the farm on the JSF, and VSTOL capability. Seems to me the Marine Corps had a long and illustrious history of both maritime service and aviation service before 1985 when it got the Harrier.
We seem to have hinged our unique capability on the EFV and the JSF, both rediculously expensive and very mission specific, and as both are cut and face the chopping block, respectively, we lose our reason for being. As opposed to hinging our unique capability on the amphibious/expeditionary/maritime missions that are independent of a specific piece of equipment. Sure equipment is an enabler to those missions, but should not rely on it entirely.
If you've ever worked with the Army, and seen how they roll, ie, the massive ass behind them in the form of log trains, field kitchens, huge tents with heat and a/c, facilities, etc, etc, etc, the Marine Corps is in no way a second land army. If someone accuses of that, the better answer is to educate them on the difference between the two rather than asking for billion dollar projects to make us appear more different. I spent OIF 1 operating at a land based field with AM2 matting, sleeping on a cot in a tent with no a/c, using porta shitters, and somehow managed to make it work. The days of working on concrete, sleeping on a real bed in a can or swa hut with a/c and flush toilets came much later.
This is key, and it is what is going to give MEU COs and Commodores (and their Embark officers!) fits in the years to come. How do we mass forces effectively when our largest ARG ship no longer has a well deck? We need a way to get our guns and trucks ashore, and we've eliminated our largest well and vehicle decks with the LHA-6. I suspect that Commodores are going to be hesitant to go split-ARG much anymore.
To continue to beat the horse, our ARGs and MEUs are not going anywhere. They're just entirely too relevant these days. For example, a recent MEU simultaneously supported HADR in one country with one ship, did a no-shit VBSS (counter-piracy) with another ship, and conducted a maritime rescue with the third ship. Three separate, significant, high-visibility operations conducted nearly simultaneously thanks to the unique capabilities of Amphibs.
The lack of a well deck on the new LHAs is such an epic fail that I have a hard time believing that it wasn't dreamed up as a way to justify keeping overall ship numbers up. "You can't cut the San Antonios, senator. They're the only ships we have with well decks!" It's also a way to justify a heavy-lift replacement helicopter.
A MEU isn't going to be able to stay ashore for any length of time with only rotorborne supplies, no matter what. At that stage, they ARE like the 82nd Airborne in Desert Shield--speed bumps. How many ops of any consequence can be performed with only the gear on the Marines' backs? Not to mention that if it it happens to be cloudy, you're pretty much out of schlitz.
Really? You don't say...
Yeah, and it was all done without a single Osprey. Or so I've heard.
Watching the phrog get to do cool missions is like watching a Dave Cummings movie: you're happy the old guy is getting some action, but you're disturbed to see it, and you know that if it keeps going much longer, eventually it's all going to end in disaster for all involved.
In contrast, the Osprey is, of course, the answer to all our problems. Also, it cures male-pattern baldness and gonorrhea.
You're so bitter for someone who flies everyday!
From the Army stand point, do not look to the functions and time tables of Desert Storm to give you an accurate portrayal of "the massive ass" the Army has to up end and move. There are a couple major elements to remember that have happened in the 20 years since then.
First is the movement from heavy Legacy divisions arrayed for a fight with the Soviets to the Brigade Combat Team. We have moved most of our stuff out of Germany. We just cased up the colors for the Big Red 1 which was our last heavy division in Germany. All that is left here now will be Cavalry elements and Striker Brigades so far as ground forces. Those are much quicker to deploy.
Second, the inclusion of the C17 and retirement of the 141 from the AMC. When desert storm happened the only aircraft that could move a good portion of our equipment (M1 family, MLRS, just about every vehicle bigger than a Humvee/5ton) was the C5. Now we have moved to a point where all our strategic airlift is capable of moving the heaviest items save for our Super Cargos which have to go aboard ship. But every vehicle, helicopter, etc we own can go into an aircraft and be on the other side of the world far faster than putting it on a boat and floating it there.
Im not putting these in here to make the argument that we can replace the Army as a rapid deployment force. Im stating that the Corps has a much harder job now because we arent nearly as slow as we were 15 years ago when most of the key leadership making these decisions was at the field/company grade dealing with it first hand.
First is the movement from heavy Legacy divisions arrayed for a fight with the Soviets to the Brigade Combat Team. We have moved most of our stuff out of Germany. We just cased up the colors for the Big Red 1 which was our last heavy division in Germany. All that is left here now will be Cavalry elements and Striker Brigades so far as ground forces. Those are much quicker to deploy.
Second, the inclusion of the C17 and retirement of the 141 from the AMC. When desert storm happened the only aircraft that could move a good portion of our equipment (M1 family, MLRS, just about every vehicle bigger than a Humvee/5ton) was the C5. Now we have moved to a point where all our strategic airlift is capable of moving the heaviest items save for our Super Cargos which have to go aboard ship. But every vehicle, helicopter, etc we own can go into an aircraft and be on the other side of the world far faster than putting it on a boat and floating it there.
Im not putting these in here to make the argument that we can replace the Army as a rapid deployment force. Im stating that the Corps has a much harder job now because we arent nearly as slow as we were 15 years ago when most of the key leadership making these decisions was at the field/company grade dealing with it first hand.