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How many of you have ejected?

midhusker

Discovering my inner nerd-ness
It wasn't VT land, it was an operational squadron. We all thought it was pretty strange too.
 

DesertRooster

The King of Nothing
I didn't want to make a new thread about ejections so I've decided to post it here.
I came across the story and thought that it was interesting.
It also doesn't tell how the two pilots ended up.
"
Out of fuel, Out of Time and One Chance to Land
super_hornet.jpg

The Virginian-Pilot | Apr 12, 2014 | by Mike Hixenbaugh
The aircraft carrier Dwight D. Eisenhower was finally in sight.

The pilot of the F/A-18 Super Hornet hurriedly flipped switches and pushed levers. The aviator in the backseat leaned forward, straining to see the flight deck floating in the distance. The jet's right engine had locked up, its landing gear jammed, the main fuel tank almost empty.





At nearly 350 mph, the Super Hornet hurtled over the warm waters of the North Arabian Sea last April. The pilot had made some tough decisions that day; several hadn't gone his way.

Now he was out of options. He had one chance to land.

___

The two-seat Super Hornet had launched off the Eisenhower's flight deck five and half hours earlier. It was one of several jets from Virginia Beach-based Strike Fighter Squadron 103 tasked with providing close air support -- a show of aerial force -- to aid troops on the ground in Afghanistan.





The pilot guided the jet through dark rain clouds over Pakistan. After escaping the storm system, he moved toward a KC-135 Stratotanker, an Air Force fuel plane in the skies of Afghanistan.

The 600-mile flight from the Arabian Sea -- a familiar journey for Navy fighter pilots after more than a decade of war -- requires Super Hornets to make at least two mid-air refuelings.

With the flip of a switch, the pilot extended a refueling probe from the jet's nose. He moved into position behind the tanker, toward a fuel line that dangles behind it. The pilot carefully steered the probe into a basket at the end of the fuel line.

The mid-air connection was a success; jet fuel began flowing into the Super Hornet's tanks. After eight minutes, it had taken in about 14,800 pounds of gas.

Suddenly, they hit unexpected turbulence. The fuel line rippled violently and wrapped itself around the basket and probe.

The pilot eased up on the throttle to back out of the connection. Instead, the hose detached from the basket and began spewing fuel.

Gas streamed into the fighter jet's right engine intake. Worse, the fuel basket was stuck on the probe, which could no longer be retracted. That meant the jet -- flying over a war zone, hundreds of miles from its home ship -- would not be able to refuel again in the air.

The mission had abruptly changed for aircraft number 206: now it was about getting home.

___

A warning tone sounded and caution lights lit up the cockpit. Sensors told the pilot something was wrong with the right engine, which had ingested the fuel.

The pilot made some quick calculations. He had 15,500 pounds of fuel in his tanks, enough to return to the Eisenhower and make six passes at the ship.

Landing in nearby Kandahar was a more prudent option, but that would likely would have meant several days or more awaiting repairs. The Eisenhower's air wing commander had decided earlier not to put a maintenance detachment in Afghanistan -- a cost-saving measure pilots perceived as a signal they should attempt to divert back to the ship whenever possible.

The pilot and his backseat weapons systems officer agreed: The situation wasn't serious enough to land immediately. They broke away from the group to begin the long return to the Eisenhower.

By the time they realized much of their fuel was unusable, it would be too late to reverse course and land in Kandahar.

___

The jet had flown more than 400 miles, two-thirds of the way back to the ship, when the aviators noticed another problem.

The pumps that move fuel from reserve tanks on the wings into the main tanks are automatically disabled when the refueling probe is extended.

The pilot had been staring at that probe and the attached basket for more than an hour but failed to realize its effect on the fuel pumps. He knew the hulking metal contraption sticking up from the nose of the jet was putting extra drag on the aircraft, causing it to burn more fuel; he figured the 3,000 pounds of gas in the wing tanks would more than make up for it.

The aviators didn't panic when they realized the fuel pumps weren't running. The pilot would try to use gravity to move the gas. He began "slipping and cross controlling" the aircraft -- a maneuver to tilt the wing up a few degrees while still flying straight. Alternating the tilt should move fuel from the wing tanks. But the maneuver also burns more fuel.

They didn't know it yet, but even with the tilt, not enough gas was flowing.

___

The Super Hornet was about 140 miles from the ship -- most of the way home -- when a voice from the Ike's tower crackled over the radio with a question: "What would you call your usable fuel?"

"Thirty-seven hundred pounds if no additional fuel transferred from the wings," the pilot replied, then let his own words sink in. He had been counting on at least 4,500 pounds, but more than 1,000 pounds of fuel remained in the wings. Only about 10 or 20 pounds was transferring each minute.

At that moment, the pilot would later tell an investigator, he first realized they were in serious danger.

Seconds later, the voice of Rear Adm. Michael Gilday broke into the conversation. The commander of the Eisenhower carrier strike group was part of combat sortie to Afghanistan and had been monitoring radio chatter. He had heard enough.

"I want you to send 206 to Masirah right now," Gilday said, referring to the jet's side number and an airfield in Oman.

Attempting to land a jet on a moving aircraft carrier is difficult under the best conditions; having a damaged plane attempt it with limited fuel was too big of a risk, Gilday would say later. If the pilot failed to land on the first pass, he wouldn't have enough fuel to divert to shore, Gilday said, calling it a "hail mary."

The Super Hornet, now just 11 miles from the Eisenhower, turned toward Masirah, more than 280 miles away.

___

Twenty four minutes later, a new set of warning lights lit up the cockpit display: "R STALL," "R ENG" and "R ENG FLAMEOUT."

The right engine -- the one that had been showered with jet fuel -- had abruptly stopped working.

The pilot radioed the ship. The officer in the tower told him to jettison an empty fuel tank, then walked him through emergency procedures.

The engine was locked up and wouldn't restart. With just one engine and 1,400 pounds of usable fuel, landing in Masirah was no longer an option. The tower ordered the pilot to turn back toward the Eisenhower, 46 miles away at that point.

The pilot made the turn. He continued dipping the wings, hoping to capture fuel from the reserve tanks.

Then, without telling his backseater or the ship, the pilot made a fateful decision: He engaged the plane's auxiliary power unit in a desperate attempt to restart the right engine.

The engine didn't crank. Without realizing it -- as the ship appeared on the horizon -- the pilot had drained the sole source of reserve power he needed to lower his landing gear.

___

The officer in the tower read instructions over the radio for an emergency, single-engine landing. Without the right engine turning to power the hydraulics, the plane would have to use auxiliary power to put down the landing gear, the officer said, unaware the pilot had already drained it.

The pilot followed instructions and pulled the landing gear handle, but the wheels didn't come down.

The jet was 11 miles from the ship.

The tower told him to remove and reinsert the circuit breakers, but the trick failed to restore auxiliary power. Then they told him to try once more to restart the right engine. No luck.

The pilot frantically repeated all the emergency procedures and pulled again on the landing gear handle. This time the nose wheel came down, but the two in the back didn't.

He checked his fuel gauges. Just 700 pounds of fuel left in the main tank. Every second mattered now.

The tower officer had one last idea.

He told the pilot to accelerate to 350 mph, hoping the speed would cause the right engine to rotate in the wind and provide hydraulic power needed to drop the back wheels.

The pilot pushed the throttle: the left engine roared, the right began to rotate slowly. Finally, the landing gear popped out.

"Three down and locked," the pilot radioed, and immediately prepared to land. A landing signal officer on the flight deck told the pilot he was coming in high but lined up to land.

There was no room for error; this would be their one shot.

The jet was less than two miles from the ship when it finally ran out of gas.

___

The left engine flamed out without much warning. The digital cockpit displays went dark. The $41 million fighter jet nosed down, rolled right and began to fall from 1,200 feet.

The backseat aviator, unaware the pilot had lost control, leaned forward to see how far away the ship was. Suddenly a violent thrust blew him into the sky. The pilot had pulled the ejection handle without giving a warning.

The jet -- with nearly 2,000 pounds of fuel trapped inside -- plunged into the sea. Both aviators blacked out, hanging limp below parachute canopies, before hitting the water and coming to.

Disoriented and bleeding after the ejections, the men cut themselves free from their chutes.

The rescue helicopter arrived quickly. It returned them, finally, to the Eisenhower's flight deck.

___

About the story: This report was based on an investigation into the April 8, 2013, crash of an F/A-18 Super Hornet. Names and other identifying details were redacted from the report, which was obtained by The Virginian-Pilot through a Freedom of Information Act request. The report cited questionable decision making by the pilot but did not recommend disciplinary action."

Link http://www.military.com/daily-news/2014/04/12/out-of-fuel-out-of-time-and-one-chance-to-land.html
 

nittany03

Recovering NFO. Herder of Programmers.
pilot
None
Super Moderator
Contributor
I'll refrain from commenting on the systems geekery as it isn't my airframe, but there are many CRM lessons to be learned from this mishap, both inside and outside the cockpit. Also, I'm told that this mishap is now a textbook case to be beaten into the heads of new Rhino and Growler studs. Having read the SIR, if a few years ago, I'll shut up at that.
 

DesertRooster

The King of Nothing
I'll refrain from commenting on the systems geekery as it isn't my airframe, but there are many CRM lessons to be learned from this mishap, both inside and outside the cockpit. Also, I'm told that this mishap is now a textbook case to be beaten into the heads of new Rhino and Growler studs. Having read the SIR, if a few years ago, I'll shut up at that.
Do you know if the pilots were injured other than what was said?
 

nittany03

Recovering NFO. Herder of Programmers.
pilot
None
Super Moderator
Contributor
Do you know if the pilots were injured other than what was said?
No. But any ejection is no picnic. That said, the details are medical info specific to those people, none of our business, and protected under HIPAA anyway. Certainly inappropriate to put on a public forum, unless it's being freely shared by the person concerned.
 

exNavyOffRec

Well-Known Member
No. But any ejection is no picnic. That said, the details are medical info specific to those people, none of our business, and protected under HIPAA anyway. Certainly inappropriate to put on a public forum, unless it's being freely shared by the person concerned.

I wonder if either is on this forum? I guess if they are and they felt the desire they could add their input to the article.

The most important part to me is that at the end of the day (so to speak) they were able to see their families again.
 

Swanee

Cereal Killer
pilot
None
Contributor
I'll refrain from commenting on the systems geekery as it isn't my airframe, but there are many CRM lessons to be learned from this mishap, both inside and outside the cockpit. Also, I'm told that this mishap is now a textbook case to be beaten into the heads of new Rhino and Growler studs. Having read the SIR, if a few years ago, I'll shut up at that.

The WSO was an IWSO of mine in the RAG. Great dude. He debriefed all of -106 on this mishap and the SIR. It's rare that we get to see into the inner workings of a crew's thought process during such situations.
 

exNavyOffRec

Well-Known Member
Seconds later, the voice of Rear Adm. Michael Gilday broke into the conversation. The commander of the Eisenhower carrier strike group was part of combat sortie to Afghanistan and had been monitoring radio chatter.

Question for those that will know, the RADM is a SWO so when they say he was part of the combat sortie, would that mean he would be in an E-2 or ????
 

MIDNJAC

is clara ship
pilot
Question for those that will know, the RADM is a SWO so when they say he was part of the combat sortie, would that mean he would be in an E-2 or ????

You mean that specific RADM, or CSG's in general? My old CSG was a pilot and regularly flew tanker hops (which is where I am guessing this guy was too) in the airwing Rhinos
 

exNavyOffRec

Well-Known Member
You mean that specific RADM, or CSG's in general? My old CSG was a pilot and regularly flew tanker hops (which is where I am guessing this guy was too) in the airwing Rhinos

That specific RADM, not sure what "part of the combat sortie" actually means, I have visions of the USAF people getting BSM while sitting at Whiteman AFB in MO for airstrikes in the middle east.
 
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