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For those of you who like Big Picture/Strategic subjects
- Thread starter Fog
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Spekkio
He bowls overhand.
I sincerely doubt that the Chinese are going to try to use brute force to take over an entire region. That's contrary to what they've done historically. I also doubt that East Asian countries are going to band together in trustworthy relationships in the next decade or two.
Total sidebar: BMD is not and has never been about defense from nation-states launching waves of missiles. It's meant to take out that lone, rogue missile with a reasonable chance of destroying it. Or, in the case of the ABL... actually, I haven't heard of a scenario that uses the ABL. Which is probably why it's now the ABLT (testbed).
Did you happen to read SECDEF's remarks? You know, the one about how we have a bigger navy than the next 13 countries combined? 11 of which are our allies?
Also missing in this: threat to what? What do you envision the endstate of a Chinese "victory" and a US "loss" would entail?
"Did you happen to read SECDEF's remarks? You know, the one about how we have a bigger navy than the next 13 countries combined? 11 of which are our allies?"
Yes I did. Look at the relative trends of the size of the Chinese military vs the sizes of the U.S. and allied militaries. This isn't about what the military situation is today; it's about what the military future is likely to be. And when you refer to the "size of the navies", you need to consider where China would be likely to use their navy, and the proximity to their land-based assets.
"What do you envision the endstate of a Chinese "victory" and a US "loss" would entail? "
Significant increase in Chinese influence with a corresponding significant decrease in U.S. influence.
Yes I did. Look at the relative trends of the size of the Chinese military vs the sizes of the U.S. and allied militaries. This isn't about what the military situation is today; it's about what the military future is likely to be. And when you refer to the "size of the navies", you need to consider where China would be likely to use their navy, and the proximity to their land-based assets.
"What do you envision the endstate of a Chinese "victory" and a US "loss" would entail? "
Significant increase in Chinese influence with a corresponding significant decrease in U.S. influence.
I really, really wish you were right. Make that; I hope you ARE right.
But it doesn't matter -- as Gates is trying to 'justify' and 'rationalize' to give us a preview of $$$$ cuts to come in DoD. He dances to the tune of his masters. And it's because we've spent too much treasure on the 'socializing' of America and we're B-R-O-K-E as far as the eye can see ...
As an aside: what do YOU plan on doing when 'Uncle' no longer 'needs you' ... ???
The ChiComs could make it wa-a-a-a-a-a-a-ayyyy too costly for us to operate in the Taiwan Strait. They shot a couple of missiles into it a few years back and we all had to detour way-the-hell-and-gone to bypass it. And they could do it on the 'cheap' as well. You do remember Korea, don't you??? Our 'best & brightest' of the day did not respect the ChiComs nor their commitment to ideology, much to our enduring pain & sacrifice ...
Chinese consumers don't like it?? No problem -- shoot 'em. That's what they do ... think about that next time you're vacationing in Tianamen Square.
Another example: the Iranians could close the Straits if they really wanted to ... even if only w/ funky WW1 or WW2 technology mines. Or at least they could make it very, very costly to keep it open. Assuming, of course, they can get their shit together. But then, they DO believe in the ultimate 'sacrifice' for the 'cause', don't they ... ???
The ChiComs?? Do you think they'd exchange a couple of missiles and/or a sub or two or three for a carrier?? That's a deal I'd buy ...
This is a case where 'size' (of our Navy vs. our potential opponents' Navy) doesn't matter ...
Just my tried & true 'Cold War' viewpoint showing through ... and my $20 worth ...
I completely agree - and think that the point needs to be restated for emphasis. It doesn't matter because the sea lanes (bah, SLOC, I have no need for your JPME-speak) are critical for *everyone.* Everyone relies on them for cheap trade, thus making them integral to the world. Anyone who goes to upset that balance is going to have the world breathing down their necks economically. And barring a straight up WarGames decapitation scenario where all the other major powers are whacked with the nuclear stick, China depends on the US (access to cheap oil, exporting goods) far more than the US depends on China.
Here's the rub. I think there are far fewer true believers than pragmatists who see trade as a way to wealth - not necessarily dominance. Especially when the US offers so many cultural goodies (McD's, MTV, etc. etc.). The resultant economic and cultural pain ("we can't have our American TV show/fast food/music? DEATH TO THE RULERS!") won't be worth the quick short-term gain in power such an attack would bring.A4sForever said:
Now, is China's relative power waxing? Hell yeah - 1B people and their spending power are difficult to ignore. Is the US's power waning? From its height at the end of the cold war (or, the 1991 Gulf War), I'd say yes. But, short of building an empire, there was nowhere to go BUT down. Realistically, we literally can't afford to buy hundreds of billion-dollar weapons or even hundreds of $100M weapons repeatedly. Power projection is amazing but hellaciously expensive in both capital and labor when used on a long-term basis. And yes, until we recharge the land services, we're relatively more vulnerable against major powers.
But it's all relative. Vulnerability, power, cost. Just depends on how much pain you can endure.
As for the aside: that's a very, very good question - one that I think about a good deal. No answer yet.
Good stuff; thought provoking.
You're a 'smart boy' ... 'scuse me for calling you 'boy' ...
There was an ol' ''joke'' ... something from the '30s or '40s ... something from the Prom or Cotillion and went thusly:
"OH, BOY ... BOY ... my friend has just puked all over himself and passed out in his soup !!! OH, BOY ... !!! Can you clean him up ???
It was a very 'popular' mirthful moment when considered w/ a backdrop of the '30s/'40s ... I suppose you just had to be there to appreciate it.
*edit* and /threadjack
In Nagoya, a group of young turks from Nagoya University and I had a running dialog on the subject. I think most believed that it was time for Japan to change it's alliances, time to rethink the notions held dear since WWII. That was their beliefs. A general discussion with some other long time friends in Japan (60 something ish) that strengthened the notion held by me that indeed a shift is indeed underway, within the Government, with the support of the population in general. The 60's crowd were not saying this should happen, rather it is happening. Subtle difference.
Okinawa seems to be the flash point, that is the GOJ rebelling against committments made to the USA. While the move of Atsugi operations to Iwakuni, another agreement with GOJ seems to me to be stalled, that is no forward movement of the plan. I know that is apples and oranges and cannot be compared directly to one another, I think it is a victim of an shift in the GOJ approach to the overarching issue (no BLUF intended). I have a recent email from someone station in Atsugi, but have not yet been given permission to post contents.
While I am not as smart as others who can declare that China is not a problem and that the US could deal with any eventality, I simply am saying that I see major changes underway in the way that Japan deals with the USA, and in turn, China.
It's not that China isn't a problem, it's that it's not the next Evil Empire about to sweep the Pacific. Japan shifting away from the US doesn't mean they're shifting towards China. The main players in the region are well strong enough to assert their own interests as opposed to being treated as pawns for one side or another. India too, is a rising power, and the "enemy of my enemy" logic fails if you look at them merely as a Russian customer or a longtime foe of Pakistan. They are a healthy democracy with whom we have strong relationships. They're also a rising military and naval power who have never gotten along with the Chinese and are getting carriers of their own - probably sooner than the Chinese will. Their indigenous military industry is easily a match for the Chinese and they can realistically outpace China economically. They will be a power player in the region to rival China. They will stymie Chinese power, not out of fickle loyalty to the US, but their own self-interest.
Helpirn and others like him are pretty keen on painting a return to the Cold War with a new adversary, but that's a poor picture of what's actually going on.
Helpirn and others like him are pretty keen on painting a return to the Cold War with a new adversary, but that's a poor picture of what's actually going on.
I am at a distinct disadvantage in that I obviously have much less knowledge about East Asian affairs than some of you all. Adroit pronouncements in thread supported by facts contained therein remind me of some of my mis-steps on the subject. To wit:
Although DLIWC did a great job, but over the years my ability in Japanese is failing. I must struggle to read the Asahi Shimbun or the Yomiuri. I can fairly well keep up with NHK but that is also limited. I am anxious to see the results, from a Japanese perspective, of the 2 Plus 2 being held as we speak. Anyone?
I participated in the first U.S.-China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT), Beijing, PRC, May 1983. My 15 minutes of fame, Air Force One, the whole nine yards. Meeting and chatting with highest level Chinese leaders of the time was memorable. That said, I participated in drafting two of the 8 protocols agreed to during the meeting. As I re-read some of the language I agreed to in the protocols, I am stunned at how wrong we were at the time. We sorely underestimated the Chinese underdeveloped capabilities in the trade arena.
Subsequent to the meeting, a group of us, mostly from the U.S.Gov three letter agencies, spent 3 months traveling around China, visiting factories, labs and etc in China. Nothing was off limits to us, other than the military and military installations,. I jointly wrote the report, one of the gems that we wrote in 1983 was that ......”it will take China at least 20 to 30 years to developed their industries and infa-tructure to be able to compete on the world stage of commerce, especially in the high tech areas. .... “ Dip sticks we were.
The following year the Chinese Government requested from the U.S. Gov, help in developing their communications networks, in particular, the budding cell phone system. As Chief Network Engineering Director for the U.S. Gov voice/data networks, FTS, I visited China. I found little progress and my report said they would probably never have a sophisticated network throughout China. Was I ever wrong.
In 1987 I participated in drafting, providing copious amounts of data, to the OTA (Office of Technology Assessment) report on “Technology Transfer to China”. Declassified, available from GPO, Library of Congress Cat. Card # 87-619823. If you want to see some very wrong assessments, take a look at what some of the best minds thought a mere 23 years ago. 245 pages of nonsense. One Gem was the “... over the next 20 years China exports will increase but are likely never to be able to compete with U.S. products. .... “
Fast forward two years, Tiananmen Square and the June 6 Massacre or Liuu-Sii Tiisja. We (the unwashed) said it was over for the Chinese and their quest to be a major player on the international stage.
BLUF: I have been so wrong in the past, take what I say re the subject with a grain of salt. But to be sure, I will never underestimate the PRC again