I work in Installations Management now and I can say with certainty that our security force (despite having the largest budget and manning programmatically) is not equipped nor adequately trained to deal with these types of nightmare scenarios. They do what they do pretty damned well: set and maintain FPCONs. But they aren't tactical shooters. We rely on our local, state, and federal partners for a lot of these capabilities through mutual aid agreements and MOA/MOUs. Which is why I am beside myself to hear that the Capitol Police team (very well trained and equipped for this type of scenario) were directed to stand down. Fog of war, maybe. But I was in a meeting this week where a high level type said straight up that it is not realistic for us to think that we can prevent this type of thing from happening again, even after the inevitable knee jerk response. Hopefully we get better at responding and leveraging these partner relationships and C2.