Staffs and their usefulness

[Recovering LSO]

//threadjack//

WWII staffs ... had serious and significant problems back then with managing the forces they were leading, also the amount of information flowing in and out of the commands is many times more than it used to be (some of it useless but a lot of the info from intel to logisitics is vital and necessary) and while our forces and personnel have shrunk in size their greatly increased lethality coupled with a greater awreness of what is going on demands a lot more responsibility and control of those forces to a degree.

Sounds like they might have worked a little better than you think. Decentralized execution... Mission Command. Coherent statements of Commander's intent... You kind of described them all

 

[Flash]

Sounds like they might have worked a little better than you think. Decentralized execution... Mission Command. Coherent statements of Commander's intent... You kind of described them all

Threadjack//

Read some detailed history about how they actually worked and you will find plenty of missteps, mistakes and malfunctions on the part of many US and allied staffs during the war. If you don't think otherwise then you have dug deep enough, just take a look at some of the failures at Dieppe, Guadalcanal, the San Bernardino Strait, Arnhem and even Iwo Jima to name a few. It doesn't take long to find numerous issues with staffs in battles that we count as great victories, and that is not counting the defeats. A perfect example is the incongruity of having two completely separate staffs independently fighting in the same theater while competing over strategy and for precious resources that could have been better focused in a single command. It was only because our overwhelming industrial strength that we were able to pull it off.

We didn't need really awesome staffs to win the war just like we didn't need the best tanks (Germans) or torpedoes (Japanese) either but it would have helped out a bit if some of them operated better than they did.

//End Threadjack

Split if necessary, I don't want to detract from a great thread.

 

[insanebikerboy]

A perfect example is the incongruity of having two completely separate staffs independently fighting in the same theater while competing over strategy and for precious resources that could have been better focused in a single command.

Isn't that exactly the point? Two staffs in the Pacific Theatre would have been better suited if combined as one?

 

[lowflier03]

Read some detailed history about how they actually worked and you will find plenty of missteps, mistakes and malfunctions on the part of many US and allied staffs during the war.

A perfect example is the incongruity of having two completely separate staffs independently fighting in the same theater while competing over strategy and for precious resources that could have been better focused in a single command.

Yes, the problem came from the overlap of multiple staffs. Hence an argument over having too many/too much. But even in those cases the leaders made it work. i.e. the argument between Nimitz and MacArthur over the Philippines.

However if you look at some of our great leaders i.e. Nimitz, and great victories i.e. Midway, you will see that there are elements of staffs that worked well. These elements have completely gone away today. I'm sure that most people here remember the LANTFLT message from ADM King, admonishing his leaders for micromanaging, that made the rounds on AW. The orders from Nimitz to Spruance's fleet at Midway consisted of 11 pages, most of which laid out force composition. Gone are the days of leaders providing the intent and desired end-state and letting their subordinates get there. Hell even the successful German operations were carried out via verbal orders.

The ability to hand pick staffs that leaders knew were competent and complimented their style is also a major bonus. There are many studies about the key elements of successful staffs in history, and most of those elements seem to be missing in the US military today.

There is a necessity for a large staff, that is to process the extreme amount of information available to a commander in a time of war. Unfortunately today we have the large staffs, you could argue that we are/are not in a time of war, but what is really missing is the ability to pick the best personnel for a staff, and then empowering them (and other subordinates) to do the job necessary with minimal oversight.

 

[nittany03]

A perfect example is the incongruity of having two completely separate staffs independently fighting in the same theater while competing over strategy and for precious resources that could have been better focused in a single command.

Well, we also rotated TF 58 and 38 so as to let one staff plan while the other was executing, and confuse the Japanese about how many fleets we actually had. That seemed to work. Agreed that the MacArthur/Nimitz split was foolish. Many more ego-driven decisions in those days, it seems.

 

[Brett327]

The ability to hand pick staffs that leaders knew were competent and complimented their style is also a major bonus. There are many studies about the key elements of successful staffs in history, and most of those elements seem to be missing in the US military today.

There is a necessity for a large staff, that is to process the extreme amount of information available to a commander in a time of war. Unfortunately today we have the large staffs, you could argue that we are/are not in a time of war, but what is really missing is the ability to pick the best personnel for a staff, and then empowering them (and other subordinates) to do the job necessary with minimal oversight.

I can tell you that there is a fairly robust vetting process for people assigned to the JS - even at the O4 AO level. Hand picking definitely happens at the GOFO level and even for some senior O6 positions. Not sure how you could extend that to the AO level in a joint environment. I can't speak to the service staffs, but there's not a lot of dead weight (or people marking time until retirement) on the JS or the major COCOMs. The JS is also a very flat organization - it has to be. The amount of unvarnished interaction between CJCS and the O4/O5 action officers would probably surprise you.

 

[Flash]

Yes, the problem came from the overlap of multiple staffs. Hence an argument over having too many/too much. But even in those cases the leaders made it work. i.e. the argument between Nimitz and MacArthur over the Philippines.

Not an agreement by Nimitz but something foisted on him by his bosses, his staff preferred Formosa.

I'm sure that most people here remember the LANTFLT message from ADM King, admonishing his leaders for micromanaging, that made the rounds on AW.

From a guy who was pretty bad about micromanaging things himself.

However if you look at some of our great leaders i.e. Nimitz, and great victories i.e. Midway, you will see that there are elements of staffs that worked well. These elements have completely gone away today....The orders from Nimitz to Spruance's fleet at Midway consisted of 11 pages, most of which laid out force composition. Gone are the days of leaders providing the intent and desired end-state and letting their subordinates get there. Hell even the successful German operations were carried out via verbal orders.

That was largely a result of the time, he wasn't able to exercise control over his deployed forces largely becasue of the limitations of technology at the time. I doubt his staff would have had the capacity to do so either.

There is a necessity for a large staff, that is to process the extreme amount of information available to a commander in a time of war. Unfortunately today we have the large staffs, you could argue that we are/are not in a time of war, but what is really missing is the ability to pick the best personnel for a staff, and then empowering them (and other subordinates) to do the job necessary with minimal oversight.

There is an increased expectation of knowing what is going on and responding to it in a very rapid fashion nowadays, that requires a much larger staff than the days of WWII even during 'peacetime'. It took days for things to filter back to leadership where now it can take minutes depending on importance. We have exponentially more resources when it comes to information from the volume to the variety (Twitter to satellites) but a lot less resources when it comes to forces and personnel. In order to make sure those resources and forces are managed correctly requires people making sure it is done in the most efficient and effective manner as possible.

Folks may bemoan the fact that we have way more tail than tooth nowadays but that balance allowed us to invade and occupy a country on the other side of a globe just a month after being attacked with forces that were very well equipped, informed and supported the whole time.

 

[jmcquate]

I've always thought that Gen. Shartzkoft's staff served him well during Desert Storm. Gen. Horner's staff work in particular.

 

[wink]

A referance was made to staffs leading. Not my experience at all. A staff does not lead, the commander they support does the leading and deciding. If the staff is deficient it is likely the commander's, or at least his CoS's responsibily.

I was an Asst Air Operations Officer for Naveur ( a four star then). Back before Africa Com we had all but Centcom's share of Africa in our AOR. Not counting a couple reserve pukes like your humble correspondent, the N3 consisted of just 7 officers. The air shop was 3 of those 6. I think they were pretty efficient.

 

[Kaman]

Staffs and their usefulness...Sounds like an oxymoron or contradiction in terms. Sure, they are useful. Especially, if they buy the donuts...My Dad was a staff officer in the USAF at different points, and that is what he told me!

 

[wink]

Staffs and their usefulness...Sounds like an oxymoron or contradiction in terms. Sure, they are useful. Especially, if they buy the donuts...My Dad was a staff officer in the USAF at different points, and that is what he told me!

That is because he was USAF! If staffs were not useful, then why was I so frequently on the phone answering questions of the subordinate commands, planning exercises the fleet played in, getting PPRs for guys from pain in the ass USAF bases, keeping said USAF off the backs of Navy base ops officers because their TACAN was down and the USAF needed it for a divert when all EUCOM was VMC, planning contingencies for relief and intervention in African genocide, Balkan genocide, and getting the Navy airborne again after DOD grounded all military aviation with idiotic rules in the wake of Sec Brown's plane crash. No time for donuts. It was all we could do to take a break for a beer at 1500 every day. Staffs are worthless until you have been part of one. Everyone wants to go to Cobra Gold, Bright Star, Foal Eagle, Red Flag, etc, but don't think for a second who set all that up. How is it that you can just drop into some foreign military field? Some staff puke set it up and maintains the relationship. Load a bunch of grub onto your ship in a foreign port, fuel up and go, thank a staff weenie. Dropping bombs in the UK, Japan, or Norway, thank a staff guy. Fighting RAF Tornados or Luftwaffe Eurofighters, yup, staff guys set it up for you. No one ever called to say "Thanks" or bought me one at the pub either.

 

[azguy]

If staffs were not useful, then why was I so frequently on the phone answering questions of the subordinate commands...

Are staffs all bad, no way. But this is a terrible point. Lots of staff pukes out there licking their own ice cream cone. Not that they are bad guys, but you have to break out. If you're on a staff that is even slightly overmanned, this may mean creating churn for your subordinate commands in the name bolstering of some meaningless metric that you have invented.

No one ever called to say "Thanks" or bought me one at the pub either.

 

[Kaman]

I fulfilled a staff function as a CNAP evaluator, and it was an enjoyable job. Although, I really didn't like poking around in my buddies squadrons, their records and all that. My biggest fear was always uncovering a major discrepancy, and all the unpleasantness associated with that. Fortunately, I never encountered that and they were always squared away.

 

[wink]

Are staffs all bad, no way. But this is a terrible point. Lots of staff pukes out there licking their own ice cream cone. Not that they are bad guys, but you have to break out. If you're on a staff that is even slightly overmanned, this may mean creating churn for your subordinate commands in the name bolstering of some meaningless metric that you have invented.

Think my point would be that "staffs" aren't bad. As you say there might be some guy creating busy work to aggrandize himself, but you get that everywhere, even at a squadron level. And even then I submit the vast majority of staffs are not self licking ice cream cones. The work they do to support the subordinate commands far out weighs the occasional guy trying to impress the CoS with new metrics and reports. I suspect most fleet guys would trade the rare bogus report they have to file for an invite to a major exercise, positive endorsement for larger budget, or cover from a marauding higher authority. I saw NAVEUR tell the White House he would not order a specific mission they demanded because he thought it was unwise (big picture) and even dangerous. The guys who would have flown those missions had no idea how they were protected by a far away four star and a few staff pukes.

 

[jmcquate]

I think you all are discussing the internal politics of a given staff as opposed to the usefulness of a staff to a commanding officer. The modern staff system was a Prussian invention first officially employed in 1814 that proved quite useful. The first U.S.Army staff was the U.S.Army staff structure during the Civil War and proved a much better way to control an army in battle than Lee's disjointed command structure that relied on Lee's personal relationships with his corps commanders who had a bad habit of being KIA. Staffs are an integral part of giving a battlefield commander the C3I to best inform to make decisions when putting are young men and women in harms way.