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WWII Aerial Photos

HeyJoe

Fly Navy! ...or USMC
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I try very hard not to and I do not mean to suggest anything to the contrary. It is simply my experience that people who believe themselves to be knowledgeable on the subject (or use it as some kind of talking point) like to reduce it down to industrial simplicity and inevitability.

I'm still learning stuff on the subject. People tend to want to reduce things to their basics, but sometimes large complex endeavors define such generalizations. Yamamoto aparently knew the tremendous industrial capacity of the United States and how long it would take for the "Sleeping Giant*" to awake. His prediction to the Japanese War Cabinet was he could "run wild for six months", but gave no guarantees after that for he knew America would be mobilized and pushing back at Japan's territorial expansion. In fact, exactly six months almost to the date after Pearl Harbor, the first carrier vs carrier battle unfolded in the Coral Sea as the United States Navy challenged the Japanese invasion of Port Moresby in New Guinea.

*The Sleeping Giant quote is used in two movies about Pearl Harbor, but may be a theatrical invention in the end.

Kursk is a great example. Visions of Enemy at the Gates; seem to dominate cultural understanding of the Eastern front. I think the idea that the Russians could have bested the Germans because of tactics and not by shear numbers alone would be unusual to many people.

If you look at the continued clashes between the Israelis and Arab nations in the Middle East, you'll see tactics and tenacity of individuals prevailing over technology quite often although there have technical surprises that got best of Israelis on more than one occasion (The Egyptians caught the Israelis totoally off guard in 1973 with tactics and some technology like Anti-tank missiles such as the Sagger and advanced SAMs like the SA-6, but crossing the canal was a true coup with water jets used to dissolve the huge sand berms). Of course, the Israelis turned the tables on the Egyptians with their own crossing and then cutting off the invading armies. Only thing common to all conflicts is the key individuals making decisions either on the battlefront or far in the rear that have short, mid and long term implications for success.

I don't mean to be typing here asking for answers and the abbridged version; I've merely been thinking aloud (for better for worse :eek:).

Pretty good questions, don't apologize for them.
 

Catmando

Keep your knots up.
pilot
Super Moderator
Contributor
Just some random but related thoughts for the day......

  • The massive allied bombing was as Fog indicated, terribly inaccurate, and the numbers of aircraft and crews lost were staggering, especially considering the relative meager results for the massive effort. More than crippling or destroying the German war production, strategic bombing's most positive results with the widespread destruction of towns and villages was to finally turn the populace against the Nazis regime. Even more than Stalingrad, its convinced most of the population the war would be lost.

  • German armament production always lagged Allied production, even before the massive bombing raids. Indeed, at the time of Stalingrad, the Soviet Union was producing 2,000 tanks a month, compared to Germany's mere 500.

  • While bombing raids did impact German armament production, other factors played a larger part. Coal and steel became very difficult to obtain. Oil was scarce. And the Germans opted for quality, rather than quantity. While they started the war with poor quality weaponry, they then focused on much greater quality – requiring more lengthy design and production effort, thus slowing the needed quantities available. But perhaps the largest obstacle to wartime production was the forced and prisoner labor used, since able-body Germans were sent to the front. Poorly fed, abused, and overworked, their slave labor production rates were understandably pathetic.

  • Initially, German arms production was horribly inefficient. At one time during the war there were 42 combat aircraft in production, simultaneously. Speer finally reduced that to a more efficient five in production. He cut 4,000 different screws in the Ju88 to only 200.

  • In 1943 the US produced 86,000 aircraft, and 114,00 aircraft in 1944, compared to Germany's only 26,000 and 40,000 respectively. (The Soviets built 37,000 and the Brits 35,000 in 1943) Allied machine gun production was 1,110,000 in 1943 compared to Germany's 165,527.

  • Notwithstanding the horrendous losses of Allied bombers, Hitler never did put in the needed anti-aircraft defenses or air raid shelters his generals demanded.

  • The Germans made gross tactical errors, primarily because of Hitler's meddling and intransigence rather than military leadership in the field. While the early blitzkrieg tactics were superbly successful, Operation Barbarrso became a quagmire and bitter defeat. Initial success was mainly due to Stalin's denial, and a poorly equipped and trained Soviet force scompared to the Wermacht. But the Soviets quickly recovered and rallied to defend their Motherland. Meanwhile, the German supply lines became bogged down, pockets of resistance took their toll, and the German army was ill prepared for that bitter winter. Winter clothing was in short supply, weapons did not work, and the ubiquitous mud was ever present and aided defeat.... much as Agincourt, or Napoleon. From 1941 on, two-thirds of the German armed forces were always engaged on the Eastern Front. In fact, more people fought and died behind the Eastern Front than all the other theatres of war, combined! .... From 1939-45.

  • The Germans were totally outnumbered in tanks, artillery, aircraft, and troops in Operation Citadel and the Battle of Kursk – but lost only 54,000 men compared to 320,000 Russian troops. And although the Tiger and Panther tanks were far superior to the T-34, it made little difference since they were too few in number compared to the greater number of Soviet tanks. Nevertheless, the Germans lost only 252 tanks compared to nearly 2,000 Soviet tanks lost. And the Germans in the whole war never did attain air-superiority.

  • Hitler's insistence on no retreat coupled with splitting and thus weakening his forces on the Eastern front led to the annihilation of his forces. Generals who knew better and advised against this were transferred, retired, or in some cases committed suicide.

  • The German High Command realized after Stalingrad, Leningrad, and finally the battle of Kurst that they would eventually lose the war, months before the Normandy invasion and the opening of the second front.
 

HeyJoe

Fly Navy! ...or USMC
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[*]The Germans were totally outnumbered in tanks, artillery, aircraft, and troops in Operation Citadel and the Battle of Kursk – only 54,000 men compared to320, 000 Russian troops. And although the Tiger and Panther tanks were far superior to the T-34, it made little difference since they had only 252 tanks compared to nearly 2,000 Soviet tanks. And the Germans in the whole war never did attain air-superiority.

Generally agree with excellent viewpoints although most sources credit Germany with losing ~54,000 men and approx. 252 tanks out of ~900,000 troops engaged from 50 divisions so you may have pulled up casualties/losses and not the combatant's OOB. Likewise, I think you are quoting casualties for the Soviet Army as most sources credit them with as many as 1,300,00 troops engaged and ~ 3,600 tanks of which an estimated 2,000 were lost. Definitely a meat-grinder, but Soviets used up to date intel to prepare a hot reception for the German onslaught.
 

Catmando

Keep your knots up.
pilot
Super Moderator
Contributor
Generally agree with excellent viewpoints although most sources credit Germany with losing ~54,000 men and approx. 252 tanks out of ~900,000 troops engaged from 50 divisions so you may have pulled up casualties/losses and not the combatant's OOB. Likewise, I think you are quoting casualties for the Soviet Army as most sources credit them with as many as 1,300,00 troops engaged and ~ 3,600 tanks of which an estimated 2,000 were lost. Definitely a meat-grinder, but Soviets used up to date intel to prepare a hot reception for the German onslaught.
Thanks, good catch and my mistake. You are right about the numbers - they were losses - and I will correct them my original. Also, Soviet intel was a key factor as you say in that meat grinder.
 
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