Here's a couple reports about the midair collision that occured on November 16, 2000 between the F-16 and Cessna near Bradenton, FL. The first one is the Air Force's version and the second is the NTSB's preliminary report.
LANGLEY AIR FORCE BASE, Va. (ACCNS) -- Air Combat Command determined that a critical combination of avionics anomalies, procedural errors and individual mistakes -- on the ground and in the air -- led to the Nov. 16, 2000, midair collision between an F-16 and a Cessna 172 near Bradenton, Fla.
The Cessna pilot, call sign Cessna 829, was killed in the accident. The F-16 pilot, call sign Ninja 2, ejected and sustained minor injuries. Both aircraft were destroyed in the accident.
At the time of the accident, Ninja 2 was part of a two-ship formation preparing to begin a surface-attack training mission at the Avon Park Air Force Range. The Cessna had taken off from Sarasota-Bradenton International Airport. The other F-16, call sign Ninja 1, was not damaged in the accident and returned safely to Moody Air Force Base, Ga.
Air Force investigators identified two causes of the mishap. First, Ninja 2 and Cessna 829 failed to "see and avoid" each other in sufficient time to prevent the mishap. According to the accident investigation report, Ninja 2 expected Ninja 1 to make a sharp left turn onto a low-level military training route at any moment. His immediate focus was to see and avoid Ninja 1. Just prior to the collision, Ninja 2 saw a white flash, but didn't realize it was another aircraft. There was conflicting testimony as to whether Cessna 829 saw the F-16 and attempted to maneuver his aircraft prior to the collision.
Second, Tampa air traffic controllers failed to transmit a safety alert to Cessna 829 when their radar system generated "Conflict Alert" warnings, indicating that two aircraft were in danger of a collision. Investigators determined that if the controllers had issued a safety alert to the Cessna when the first Conflict Alert began, it is likely the pilot would have had time to maneuver to avoid the collision.
In addition, investigators identified three factors that substantially contributed to the accident. First, the F-16 flight lead, Ninja 1, lost situational awareness and descended under Visual Flight Rules into Tampa Class B airspace without proper clearance from Tampa Approach. Ninja 1 was required to either avoid entry into Class B airspace or request permission from Tampa Approach to enter.
Second, Ninja 1's aircraft developed a position error in its navigation system that the pilot failed to recognize. The aircraft was actually nine to 11 miles south of where the pilot believed it to be, based on his INS reading. As a result, Ninja 1 unknowingly navigated his flight into Sarasota Class C airspace without the required communications with air traffic controllers.
Finally, investigators determined that Ninja 1 had made an inadvertent cursor input to his navigation system during the mission. The pilot failed to recognize the error when he switched into ground attack steering mode. As a result, he unknowingly navigated the flight further off course. If Ninja 1 had noticed the error when he switched to the ground attack steering mode and corrected it, investigators believe the collision could have been avoided.
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NTSB Identification: MIA01FA028A
Accident occurred Thursday, November 16, 2000 at BRADENTON, FL
Aircraft:Lockheed-Martin F-16CG, registration: 2104
Injuries: 1 Fatal, 1 Uninjured.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.
On November 16, 2000, at about 1548 Eastern Standard Time, an F-16CG, SN: 89-2104, operated by the 347th Wing, Air Combat Command, Moody Air Force Base (AFB), Valdosta, Georgia, and a Cessna 172, N73829, registered to Crystal Aero Group, operating as a 14 CFR Part 91 personal flight, experienced a midair collision in the vicinity of Bradenton, Florida. Visual flight conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. The F-16 was one of two airplanes operating on a low altitude training mission, and had filed a composite military IFR/VFR flight plan. Flight lead call sign was Ninja 1, the wingman's call sign was Ninja 2. No flight plan was filed for the Cessna 172. The pilot of the F-16 (Ninja 2) successfully ejected and the Cessna pilot (who was Airline Transport Pilot qualified) was fatally injured. The two F-16s departed Moody AFB at 1513. The Cessna 172 departed Sarasota Bradenton International Airport (SRQ) about 3 minutes before the accident.
According to ATC, the F-16 flight cancelled instrument flight rules (IFR) and began a visual flight rules (VFR) descent to enter the low altitude route. The Cessna 172 departed SRQ VFR en route to the Albert Whitted Airport (SPG), St. Petersburg, Florida. The Cessna 172 crashed in the Rosedale Golf and Country Club, Bradenton, Florida. The F-16 crashed 4 miles south of the Cessna 172 in a wooded area about 5 miles east of Sarasota, Florida.
Ninja 1 stated they were assigned a block altitude between FL250 to FL260 en route to the visual route (VR) entry point. Miami Center cleared the flight to descend to the altitude block of 15,000 to 17,000 feet. They were subsequently cleared by Miami Center to 13,000 feet. Miami Center instructed Ninja 1 to contact Tampa Approach. Ninja 1 attempted contact with Tampa approach but was unsuccessful. He reestablished contact with Miami Center and cancelled IFR. Miami Center advised him of traffic, which was acquired on radar. He informed Ninja 2 that they were going to perform a "G" check (G awareness maneuver). They accelerated to 400 knots, made a right 90-degree turn followed by a left 90-degree turn back on course, and continued their descent below 10,000 feet. He instructed Ninja 2 to assume the "fighting wing" formation. They continued the descent to about 5 to 6 miles north of the entry point for VR1098, between 5,000 to 3,000 feet trying to obtain a visual on the low-level entry point. He glanced out the right side in an attempt to gain visual on Ninja 2. He looked back to the left and observed Ninja 2 slightly below him at the 7 o' clock position. He also observed a high wing white airplane in a right turn estimated between 30 to 45 degrees. The high wing airplane and Ninja 2 collided in a left-to-left impact at about the 10 o'clock position. After the collision, Ninja 2 was observed vaporizing fuel off his right side. He informed Ninja 1 that he had experienced a midair collision and that he was streaming fuel. There was no response from Ninja 1. He then heard Ninja 2 state, "knock it off, knock it off." He began an immediate left turn to keep Ninja 2 in sight. Ninja 2 continued straight ahead, started a right turn, followed by a left turn. He saw Ninja 2's canopy depart, followed by a good chute and the airplane colliding with the ground.
Ninja 2 stated that while he was maintaining visual formation with his flight lead he saw a blur "like a sheet of white" instantly in front of him at his 11 or 12 o'clock position. The airplane shuttered violently and part of the canopy on the left side was missing. He continued straight ahead, and his visor came off of his helmet. There was a lot of wind, smoke, and a strong electrical smell in the cockpit. He called Ninja 1 on VHF radio and informed him to "knock it off" two times, but could not hear a reply. The airplane was still flying so he thought he might be able to make it to Madill AFB and initiated a right hand turn in that direction. The primary flight instruments appeared shattered and he could not read them. The engine started winding down, and he realized he would not be able to make the airport. He turned the aircraft back left towards a wooded area away from a residential area, and attempted an engine restart, which was unsuccessful. He thought he had ingested something into the engine, and performed his Critical Action Procedures for an air start. Once the airplane cleared the residential area, it started an uncommanded left roll. When the airplane went past the 90-degree point he initiated a successful ejection. During his parachute descent, he observed the airplane out of the corner of his eye, and saw it "pancake" into the ground inverted, and a postcrash fire ensued.
Witnesses stated they heard the sound of approaching jets. They looked up and observed the first jet flying towards the south followed by the second jet located to the left and slightly lower than the first jet. They also observed a small civilian airplane flying from west to east perpendicular to the military jets. The second collided with the civilian airplane and initially continued southbound. The airplane was observed to make a right turn, and then it turned back to the left. A parachute was observed, and the airplane entered into a flat spin to the left and disappeared from view below the trees. An explosion was heard, followed by heavy dark smoke rising above the terrain.
Review of transcripts between N73829 and Tampa approach, and communication between Miami Center and Tampa approach revealed that N73829 contacted Tampa approach at 15:45:19 (20:45:19Z), stating he was off SRQ at 1,600 feet. Tampa approach informed N73829 that he was radar contact and to maintain 1,600 feet at 20:45:23. N73829 acknowledged the transmission at 20:45:30. Tampa approach informed N73829 to turn left to heading 320 and to follow the shoreline northbound at 20:46:59. At 20:47:10, Tampa approach instructed N73829 to climb and maintain 3,500 feet, which was, acknowledged by N73829 at 20:47:15. Miami Center contacted Tampa approach at 20:47:55, and asked if they could tell them what altitude Ninja 1 was at, that he had lost the target. Tampa approach replied at 20:48:00, "ahh hang on I see him down at two thousand." At 20:48:09, Tampa approach informed N73829, that he had traffic off his left side at 2,000 feet. N73829 did not respond. At 20:48:55, Ninja 1 stated, "mayday mayday." At 20:49:11, Ninja 1 stated, "mayday mayday mayday F sixteen down." At 20:50:00, Ninja 1 states, "yes this is Ninja one we have an F sixteen down there is a light aircraft may have also gone down sir I am not sure."
Edited by - steve wilkins on 03/16/2001 19:23:51
Edited by - steve wilkins on 03/16/2001 19:24:36
LANGLEY AIR FORCE BASE, Va. (ACCNS) -- Air Combat Command determined that a critical combination of avionics anomalies, procedural errors and individual mistakes -- on the ground and in the air -- led to the Nov. 16, 2000, midair collision between an F-16 and a Cessna 172 near Bradenton, Fla.
The Cessna pilot, call sign Cessna 829, was killed in the accident. The F-16 pilot, call sign Ninja 2, ejected and sustained minor injuries. Both aircraft were destroyed in the accident.
At the time of the accident, Ninja 2 was part of a two-ship formation preparing to begin a surface-attack training mission at the Avon Park Air Force Range. The Cessna had taken off from Sarasota-Bradenton International Airport. The other F-16, call sign Ninja 1, was not damaged in the accident and returned safely to Moody Air Force Base, Ga.
Air Force investigators identified two causes of the mishap. First, Ninja 2 and Cessna 829 failed to "see and avoid" each other in sufficient time to prevent the mishap. According to the accident investigation report, Ninja 2 expected Ninja 1 to make a sharp left turn onto a low-level military training route at any moment. His immediate focus was to see and avoid Ninja 1. Just prior to the collision, Ninja 2 saw a white flash, but didn't realize it was another aircraft. There was conflicting testimony as to whether Cessna 829 saw the F-16 and attempted to maneuver his aircraft prior to the collision.
Second, Tampa air traffic controllers failed to transmit a safety alert to Cessna 829 when their radar system generated "Conflict Alert" warnings, indicating that two aircraft were in danger of a collision. Investigators determined that if the controllers had issued a safety alert to the Cessna when the first Conflict Alert began, it is likely the pilot would have had time to maneuver to avoid the collision.
In addition, investigators identified three factors that substantially contributed to the accident. First, the F-16 flight lead, Ninja 1, lost situational awareness and descended under Visual Flight Rules into Tampa Class B airspace without proper clearance from Tampa Approach. Ninja 1 was required to either avoid entry into Class B airspace or request permission from Tampa Approach to enter.
Second, Ninja 1's aircraft developed a position error in its navigation system that the pilot failed to recognize. The aircraft was actually nine to 11 miles south of where the pilot believed it to be, based on his INS reading. As a result, Ninja 1 unknowingly navigated his flight into Sarasota Class C airspace without the required communications with air traffic controllers.
Finally, investigators determined that Ninja 1 had made an inadvertent cursor input to his navigation system during the mission. The pilot failed to recognize the error when he switched into ground attack steering mode. As a result, he unknowingly navigated the flight further off course. If Ninja 1 had noticed the error when he switched to the ground attack steering mode and corrected it, investigators believe the collision could have been avoided.
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NTSB Identification: MIA01FA028A
Accident occurred Thursday, November 16, 2000 at BRADENTON, FL
Aircraft:Lockheed-Martin F-16CG, registration: 2104
Injuries: 1 Fatal, 1 Uninjured.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.
On November 16, 2000, at about 1548 Eastern Standard Time, an F-16CG, SN: 89-2104, operated by the 347th Wing, Air Combat Command, Moody Air Force Base (AFB), Valdosta, Georgia, and a Cessna 172, N73829, registered to Crystal Aero Group, operating as a 14 CFR Part 91 personal flight, experienced a midair collision in the vicinity of Bradenton, Florida. Visual flight conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. The F-16 was one of two airplanes operating on a low altitude training mission, and had filed a composite military IFR/VFR flight plan. Flight lead call sign was Ninja 1, the wingman's call sign was Ninja 2. No flight plan was filed for the Cessna 172. The pilot of the F-16 (Ninja 2) successfully ejected and the Cessna pilot (who was Airline Transport Pilot qualified) was fatally injured. The two F-16s departed Moody AFB at 1513. The Cessna 172 departed Sarasota Bradenton International Airport (SRQ) about 3 minutes before the accident.
According to ATC, the F-16 flight cancelled instrument flight rules (IFR) and began a visual flight rules (VFR) descent to enter the low altitude route. The Cessna 172 departed SRQ VFR en route to the Albert Whitted Airport (SPG), St. Petersburg, Florida. The Cessna 172 crashed in the Rosedale Golf and Country Club, Bradenton, Florida. The F-16 crashed 4 miles south of the Cessna 172 in a wooded area about 5 miles east of Sarasota, Florida.
Ninja 1 stated they were assigned a block altitude between FL250 to FL260 en route to the visual route (VR) entry point. Miami Center cleared the flight to descend to the altitude block of 15,000 to 17,000 feet. They were subsequently cleared by Miami Center to 13,000 feet. Miami Center instructed Ninja 1 to contact Tampa Approach. Ninja 1 attempted contact with Tampa approach but was unsuccessful. He reestablished contact with Miami Center and cancelled IFR. Miami Center advised him of traffic, which was acquired on radar. He informed Ninja 2 that they were going to perform a "G" check (G awareness maneuver). They accelerated to 400 knots, made a right 90-degree turn followed by a left 90-degree turn back on course, and continued their descent below 10,000 feet. He instructed Ninja 2 to assume the "fighting wing" formation. They continued the descent to about 5 to 6 miles north of the entry point for VR1098, between 5,000 to 3,000 feet trying to obtain a visual on the low-level entry point. He glanced out the right side in an attempt to gain visual on Ninja 2. He looked back to the left and observed Ninja 2 slightly below him at the 7 o' clock position. He also observed a high wing white airplane in a right turn estimated between 30 to 45 degrees. The high wing airplane and Ninja 2 collided in a left-to-left impact at about the 10 o'clock position. After the collision, Ninja 2 was observed vaporizing fuel off his right side. He informed Ninja 1 that he had experienced a midair collision and that he was streaming fuel. There was no response from Ninja 1. He then heard Ninja 2 state, "knock it off, knock it off." He began an immediate left turn to keep Ninja 2 in sight. Ninja 2 continued straight ahead, started a right turn, followed by a left turn. He saw Ninja 2's canopy depart, followed by a good chute and the airplane colliding with the ground.
Ninja 2 stated that while he was maintaining visual formation with his flight lead he saw a blur "like a sheet of white" instantly in front of him at his 11 or 12 o'clock position. The airplane shuttered violently and part of the canopy on the left side was missing. He continued straight ahead, and his visor came off of his helmet. There was a lot of wind, smoke, and a strong electrical smell in the cockpit. He called Ninja 1 on VHF radio and informed him to "knock it off" two times, but could not hear a reply. The airplane was still flying so he thought he might be able to make it to Madill AFB and initiated a right hand turn in that direction. The primary flight instruments appeared shattered and he could not read them. The engine started winding down, and he realized he would not be able to make the airport. He turned the aircraft back left towards a wooded area away from a residential area, and attempted an engine restart, which was unsuccessful. He thought he had ingested something into the engine, and performed his Critical Action Procedures for an air start. Once the airplane cleared the residential area, it started an uncommanded left roll. When the airplane went past the 90-degree point he initiated a successful ejection. During his parachute descent, he observed the airplane out of the corner of his eye, and saw it "pancake" into the ground inverted, and a postcrash fire ensued.
Witnesses stated they heard the sound of approaching jets. They looked up and observed the first jet flying towards the south followed by the second jet located to the left and slightly lower than the first jet. They also observed a small civilian airplane flying from west to east perpendicular to the military jets. The second collided with the civilian airplane and initially continued southbound. The airplane was observed to make a right turn, and then it turned back to the left. A parachute was observed, and the airplane entered into a flat spin to the left and disappeared from view below the trees. An explosion was heard, followed by heavy dark smoke rising above the terrain.
Review of transcripts between N73829 and Tampa approach, and communication between Miami Center and Tampa approach revealed that N73829 contacted Tampa approach at 15:45:19 (20:45:19Z), stating he was off SRQ at 1,600 feet. Tampa approach informed N73829 that he was radar contact and to maintain 1,600 feet at 20:45:23. N73829 acknowledged the transmission at 20:45:30. Tampa approach informed N73829 to turn left to heading 320 and to follow the shoreline northbound at 20:46:59. At 20:47:10, Tampa approach instructed N73829 to climb and maintain 3,500 feet, which was, acknowledged by N73829 at 20:47:15. Miami Center contacted Tampa approach at 20:47:55, and asked if they could tell them what altitude Ninja 1 was at, that he had lost the target. Tampa approach replied at 20:48:00, "ahh hang on I see him down at two thousand." At 20:48:09, Tampa approach informed N73829, that he had traffic off his left side at 2,000 feet. N73829 did not respond. At 20:48:55, Ninja 1 stated, "mayday mayday." At 20:49:11, Ninja 1 stated, "mayday mayday mayday F sixteen down." At 20:50:00, Ninja 1 states, "yes this is Ninja one we have an F sixteen down there is a light aircraft may have also gone down sir I am not sure."
Edited by - steve wilkins on 03/16/2001 19:23:51
Edited by - steve wilkins on 03/16/2001 19:24:36
