Sully retires ...

[xj220]

Oh we practiced ditching all the time in the P-3, immediate and those with a little more time. I'm talking no engine though. Sorry, I should have clarified in my previous post that when I was in the P-3 and P-8 sims they were no engine, not engine out. That's standard, engine out isn't.

 

[webmaster]

Oh we practiced ditching all the time in the P-3, immediate and those with a little more time. I'm talking no engine though. Sorry, I should have clarified in my previous post that when I was in the P-3 and P-8 sims they were no engine, not engine out. That's standard, engine out isn't.

Gotcha. Poor SA on my part reading your post! We practiced in the sim with some engine out scenarios. I.e. Could you make it back to field. All involved getting apu up promptly and strict energy management. Very low success rate.

 

[xj220]

Yeah, I like that feature on the P-8, you just hit the switch and the APU fires right up, regardless of airspeed, etc. Just have to remember to hit it...

 

[wink]

I have flown a few dead sticks in the MD80 and B737 sim. They were not graded syllabus events, but options check airmen liked to give to build confidence. I have never failed to make a field. Once was fast and rolled off the end at about 50 knots (no antilock brakes blew tires). Wouldn't get those scratches past Dad, but it was survivable. Every other time I stopped on the runway. It was easier in the 737 due to AOA indicator. I have never seen a dead stick ditch, or any ditch for that matter.

 

[Catmando]

A large gaggle of geese can be visible from a great distance. One wonders if their heads were in the cockpit, and not outside. Since there was no apparent movement to avoid the geese, they were not seen. ("See and avoid" is your friend)

While the media extolls uncommon airmanship, the NTSB does not:
From the NTSB:

"The NTSB concludes that the captain’s difficulty maintaining his intended airspeed during the final approach resulted in high AOAs, which contributed to the difficulties in flaring the airplane, the high descent rate at touchdown, and the fuselage damage. (See additional discussion in section 2.7.1.)
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16. The captain’s difficulty maintaining his intended airspeed during the final approach resulted in high angles-of-attack, which contributed to the difficulties in flaring the airplane, the high descent rate at touchdown, and the fuselage damage.

17. The captain’s difficulty maintaining his intended airspeed during the final approach resulted, in part, from high workload, stress, and task saturation.

http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/AAR1003.pdf

And then there remains the question why neither went to TOGA, since they still had some residual thrust, and instead shut them down for a relight?

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