It wasn't CAG's call on letting them stay. That isn't how the game is played.
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USN The Slow Death Of The Carrier Air Wing - Or a CSAR Threadjack
- Thread starter ChuckMK23
- Start date
So how is the game played ? (this should be good, genuinely curious)
Most people think that CAG lets them do an actual PR mission just like he/she allows them to do a training TERF mission in theater, but this is incorrect. In reality, the CCDR / JFC defines a requirement for a mission he has been directed to execute (e.g. a PR requirement for an operation). Said CCDR / JFC has been allocated forces (e.g. a CSG and its airing), and if that CCDR / JFC can meet the requirements of the mission with allocated forces, then the CCDR can direct those forces to execute the mission. This assumes that the forces are manned, trained, equipped, and capable. CAG becomes a force provider to another entity who assumes TACON of those forces.
This is no different than the CFACC telling the CSG that it must provide X sorties of (insert mission here) for an operation, as has been done non-stop since 1991 in C5F.
In this construct, CAG can recommend non-supporting or stopping the support, but that kicks the decision 'upstairs' and starts a lot of important folks asking questions.
Most recent Rotor Review has a good discussion on the GFM process. There was also a good discussion of what went into this specific det on the CDRE panel @ NHA. I believe that may still be on live leak.
This is no different than the CFACC telling the CSG that it must provide X sorties of (insert mission here) for an operation, as has been done non-stop since 1991 in C5F.
In this construct, CAG can recommend non-supporting or stopping the support, but that kicks the decision 'upstairs' and starts a lot of important folks asking questions.
Most recent Rotor Review has a good discussion on the GFM process. There was also a good discussion of what went into this specific det on the CDRE panel @ NHA. I believe that may still be on live leak.
Minor quibble: CCDR can direct CFMCC to make CSG air assets available to CFACC. CFACC doesn't have authority to task CFMCC assets. CFACC has TACON of all AF assets in theater, as well as those other assets made available to him/her. But whatever CFMCC and CFLCC assets get allocated is a CCDR-level call.
So if a random Hornet doing SSC for CFMCC goes down, the Navy can theoretically direct a CSAR organically. But if said Hornet is supporting CFACC, yes, CFACC has the entire range of assets under CAOC control to pull their bacon out of the fire, and is under no obligation to task a CSG CSAR effort if something else makes more sense.
Yes, I did just do the JAOC2C death by powerpoint this year; can't you tell?
Yes! Thanks for the correction.Yes, I did just do the JAOC2C death by powerpoint this year; can't you tell?
I think this is the video @hscs is referring to.
https://livestream.com/wab/nha/videos/156521044
I thought it was pretty telling that it came down to funding a business we don’t want to be in. Somewhere in there is a case for a helo CAG to fleet up and make a better case at higher echelons for what we can do.
@Hotdogs , I think we’re in vehement agreement on a MEU’s skill set lending itself perfectly well to conduct a successful TRAP mission. I don’t think the powers that be would pick the Navy for a dedicated CSAR if a MEU was in range, just like I don’t think they’d pick a MEU to do strikes a Carrier Air Wing is suited to.
Navy CVN based CSAR is for a limited problem set, but gives the decision makers an option. There’s also a lot of good folks in my community who give a shit, but are stuck in a chicken/egg situation of taking the mission seriously /being tasked with the mission. I’d argue the community needs to be fundamentally rethought, but that’s a different day’s arguement.
https://livestream.com/wab/nha/videos/156521044
I thought it was pretty telling that it came down to funding a business we don’t want to be in. Somewhere in there is a case for a helo CAG to fleet up and make a better case at higher echelons for what we can do.
@Hotdogs , I think we’re in vehement agreement on a MEU’s skill set lending itself perfectly well to conduct a successful TRAP mission. I don’t think the powers that be would pick the Navy for a dedicated CSAR if a MEU was in range, just like I don’t think they’d pick a MEU to do strikes a Carrier Air Wing is suited to.
Navy CVN based CSAR is for a limited problem set, but gives the decision makers an option. There’s also a lot of good folks in my community who give a shit, but are stuck in a chicken/egg situation of taking the mission seriously /being tasked with the mission. I’d argue the community needs to be fundamentally rethought, but that’s a different day’s arguement.
about 45 minutes in Air Boss addresses same question - https://livestream.com/wab/nha/videos/156521044
The man/equip issue for this mission is not understood. This is why you didn’t see PR coverage during OSW from HS, and why it took so long for CENTCOM to kick off OEF (while an ad hoc HS solution to PR was developed).
Through experience, I learned that I can have great pilots / AWs but if I don’t have the capability to do expeditionary maintenance, communicate securely, and dedicated/focused intel - I cannot do the mission. I also cannot support a mission long term if I operate on an ad hoc solution.
The issue was vaguely alluded to at NHA wrt that det.
Through experience, I learned that I can have great pilots / AWs but if I don’t have the capability to do expeditionary maintenance, communicate securely, and dedicated/focused intel - I cannot do the mission. I also cannot support a mission long term if I operate on an ad hoc solution.
The issue was vaguely alluded to at NHA wrt that det.
Brother, can you not read? I just agreed with the man about ASW. I only mocked the way the Navy approaches the debate.
Back in the “old days,” as in Vietnam, it was HC-7. They were quite the team flying the HH-3 and UH-2 on several feet-dry rescues including one by Clyde Lassen that rated an MOH (only one awarded to a Navy rotor head in Vietnam). In 1975 the squadron was shifted to the reserves and became HC-9 who lasted until 1990.
Unless something's drastically changed in the past few years, yes to your second question. Every air wing does several as part of the AWF syllabus. Sometimes with some lucky/poor bastard yoinked out of an event to go play "survivor" on the range. Definition of "lucky" or "poor" being inversely proportional to how well one habitually "dresses for egress," and how moto they are for SERE-related stuff in general.
.......and if they remember the answer too if their eyebrows were shave off during a Mescal binge on their 21st birthday.