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USN Showdown between Super Hornet and F-35
- Thread starter ChuckMK23
- Start date
Compared to what/ who? The Spanish?
Max the Mad Russian
Hands off Ukraine! Feet too
Is that sortie generating capacity very important now? When you have smart weapon and global tanking coverage, the only scenario where that capacity matters is big war with China when carriers and other ships are under constant missile attacks, i.e. this is defensive scenatio. For what the reason do you need that capacity otherwise? No banana wars claim it.
Max the Mad Russian
Hands off Ukraine! Feet too
Former USNWC dean and USN Capt (Ret) Robert Rubel stated right that - this is true. Who knows? There weren't a wars other than banana ones since the smart bombs entered the USN service routinely (1st Gulf War was USAF's smart weapon show, not NavAir's).
Russian campaign in Syria confirms your point: STOBAR, even large enough, cannot provide needed amount of sorties, but carrier-borne Russians used 99% iron bombs, so this is not relevant to smart warfare. And STOBAR might be as large as it is possible - main weakness remains: it cannot simultaneously launch and land aircraft. It is inherent limitation of the pattern.
What about STOVL, some Japanese admiral have resently explained why they need carrier-like "ASW destroyers": they need at least five ASW helos constantly in the air as to block one Russian SSN from attacking a convoy there should be 8 helos in the air: five from carrier plus three from escorting DDGs/FFGs. So there have to be at least four landing spots ready to land helos for rearming and refueling, and, counting not only carrier's aircraft but all helos of "8x8" scheme (8 escort ships plus 8 helicopters), there should be the elevators on carrier large enough to put down in hangar aircraft with unfolded rotors to repair them there. Evidently there could be a problem when the main rotors of JNSDF's HH-60 cannot be fold on the deck. Or maybe they really want to base oa those DDHs the Army or Air Force Chinooks and put them in hangar as is, unfolded. This or that, the aft elevator of those ships is like Nimitz's one if not wider. And he was making some fun from "Japan restores the carrier navy": all the efforts to make the intended helo carrier as effective as she can be are absolutely inconsistent with any hypothetical jets aboard, and vice versa: trying to base the jets and helos on a carrier when the number of helos is equal to a number of jets, let alone when the helos are main residents, is undisputable silly idea.
Russian campaign in Syria confirms your point: STOBAR, even large enough, cannot provide needed amount of sorties, but carrier-borne Russians used 99% iron bombs, so this is not relevant to smart warfare. And STOBAR might be as large as it is possible - main weakness remains: it cannot simultaneously launch and land aircraft. It is inherent limitation of the pattern.
What about STOVL, some Japanese admiral have resently explained why they need carrier-like "ASW destroyers": they need at least five ASW helos constantly in the air as to block one Russian SSN from attacking a convoy there should be 8 helos in the air: five from carrier plus three from escorting DDGs/FFGs. So there have to be at least four landing spots ready to land helos for rearming and refueling, and, counting not only carrier's aircraft but all helos of "8x8" scheme (8 escort ships plus 8 helicopters), there should be the elevators on carrier large enough to put down in hangar aircraft with unfolded rotors to repair them there. Evidently there could be a problem when the main rotors of JNSDF's HH-60 cannot be fold on the deck. Or maybe they really want to base oa those DDHs the Army or Air Force Chinooks and put them in hangar as is, unfolded. This or that, the aft elevator of those ships is like Nimitz's one if not wider. And he was making some fun from "Japan restores the carrier navy": all the efforts to make the intended helo carrier as effective as she can be are absolutely inconsistent with any hypothetical jets aboard, and vice versa: trying to base the jets and helos on a carrier when the number of helos is equal to a number of jets, let alone when the helos are main residents, is undisputable silly idea.
No arguments there.
But all the rest goes to show that when you bet the farm on STOVL, you end up really limiting yourself.
How? The purpose of an LHD is to put ground forces ashore. How does it limit the purpose of an LHD? People should start looking at this from the perspective of the intended user and not your communities parochial lens. Any modification to existing deck structure to angle the deck and insert catapult/arresting gear/crew will come with a trade off of spaces for combat cargo, berthing, fuel tanks or MLA/STP magazine stores or some other precious space we try to pack on the green fleet. Here's a grand idea, why don't we build more amphibious ships to meet our current tasking, before getting crazy and talking redesign of ships to meet a secondary mission? I don't know, I'm not a naval engineer, but the way the America class was designed was credence to what the GCE/LCE gave up in order to use the future ACE as a combat multiplier for future MEU ops. It's also the only reason why we're building 2; 1 for each coast.
Secondly, people talking about sortie generation rate, F-35B effectivess/cost, and other great things probably mean well, but miss the overall point. The primary reason we have FW on the LHD/As is allow for a command relationship that allows direct support and ease of access/use for FW aircraft and high yield ordnance that comes with it. If the future fight means LHD/As will move near a shore with a FW threat and double digit FSU-like threat, then being able to launch the alert 15 that won't take a HQ-9 into the tailpipe or riddled by a PGZ-95 on it's first pass is a hellll of a lot easier and surviable than calling the few CVNs we have that are 300 miles away probably doing something else important like Battle of the Britain over Taiwan. Anyone here who thinks that ponying up a few aircraft to help the Marines in a peer to peer fight is delusional of the threat and what the fleet's priority will be when it comes to it. People say that it will never happen again, they also said we wouldn't need a Navy or Marine Corps after we entered the nuclear age, or we'd need a ship that could embark a regimental sized unit and fly it 500 miles into another country to kill terrorists, or that the Patriots were going to come back in the 3rd quarter of this year's superbowl. Can it augment an ATO airflow with the CVN? Yes. Is that it's primary purpose? Fuck no. So stop all this crazy talk, Ops also need jets to maintain FAC(A) currency, so shut the F up and let me have the Harriers/F-35Bs.
Why does comparison to a second rate NATO power further your argument? His comment is true for all intents and purposes.
Well, we can beat the EWS rah rah drum a bit more here. We like to pride ourselves on task organization- having smaller specialized units that will complete X task really well. What do we get for fixed wing aviation? The F-35B, whether you like it or not. There isn't much specialization there. You're going to get a unit that is 5 miles wide and an inch deep. At least with the Assault Support and RW attack assets you have some options. Is the F-35B better than the Harrier? Sure. Would we be able to better task organize if we had the ability to bring aboard FW airplanes that aren't STOVL? Absolutely.
I actually find this interesting hearing points of view from F-18 dudes and their arguements for shipboard Marine FW assets. It shows how you are unintentionally far removed from the MAGTF and how it operates. I don't mean that in a negative way either. I'm not a koolair drinker myself, but I understand why we do things the way we do. Marine FW is an important part of the MAGTF, but not to the extent of increasing their part in the zero sum game in the tonnage/space allowed on current L class ships.
There isn't an aircraft currently that can fulfill every MET a VMA needs unless it is a Harrier or F-35B. I would submit to you that the F-35 fills all of those METs and provides more specialization there than the AV-8B or any other shipboard platform to include better integrating with joint players and ships in the ARG (Aegis). If you're in the party that wants light attack FW assets w/ a hook, you're encroaching on HMLA territory and provide little upside aside from longer loiter times and no FARP capability - basically a solution in search of a problem.
I would also argue that considering we operate from shore based expeditionary landing sites that the requirement of arresting gear or a long landing strip would prove challenging to produce in those enviroments and task organizing them would be more difficult. If you're the one to attest that we "never" operate like that anymore then I point to you no further than the average response time of Bastion based alert Harrier getting readbacks on the arm/dearm spots, and calling in with heading in Marjeh shortly after cycling wheels up vs an F-18 from the Indian Ocean getting routed through SW AFG and bingo out early bc he got his mission receipt at the end of his vul. (...but but but...I'll be right back we gotta hit the tanker because I forgot to yo-yo my wingman out early).
I used to be on the other side of this argument but the downsizing of the fleet and the increase in threats - particularly the rise of China and its island building frenzy - has changed my mind as of late. I find the author's argument of more amphibious ships to round out a 4 ship ARG (with 2 LPD's and 1 LSD around 1 CVL) to be very persuasive. That combination provide 3 well decks, increased logistical capacity and the ability of the big deck to switch back and forth between an assault capability and a strike capability (with tailhook F-35C, F/A-18 and E2/C2). Times have changed and we must get the most bang for the buck that we can.
The ability to project force ashore with a MEU is a very important capability - but the single most important item is to control the oceans. This must never be jeopardized.
I think that actually would work but could require shipbuilding funds that the Navy would not either be able to acquire or be hesitant to encroach upon big CVN territory. I don't think you need arresting gear and catapults to make a CVL though and a angled deck would help. The Brits proved that in the Falklands and they only had 2 aircraft carriers.
You can also control oceans with cruisers and submarines. Much more capable ones than what brought the CVs of WWII into prominence (over the horizon strike). Not saying there isn't a place for big deck CVNs, but that our long range precision guided munition capability is significantly more advanced. I have a feeling that acquiescing to the CVL model would be an acceptance of that, and Navy Aviation is not ready to accept it. I'm genuinely curious if anyone here is ready to admit that much like Iwo Jima style amphibious assaults are a thing of the past, that a midway-style carrier on carrier and a sortie generation fight might be as well? Therefore a need for 10 CVNs might be excessive? and that maybe we should invest in said flexibility, cyber warfighting, sea-basing, and SOF teams?
Meh.....kind of. Ya, mission accomplished, but at a cost. A lot of improvisation by the RN and a little help from their friends.
Since the end of WWII, CVs , CVAs, CVNs, have been used to park an airbase where ever we damn well please to to augment airspace control and CAS at a tempo that a small deck just can't do. Let the Navy be the Navy, and the Gator Navy be the Gator Navy.
Going with CVL's for the amphibs also allows the Navy an end run around the size and funding constraints of a 10 / 11 ship CVN fleet by having the as mentioned CVN's + on demand surge of multiple CVL's.
Good question about the future of carrier aviation - I have questions about it in the long term myself. Carriers replaced battleships for 2 reasons: aircraft outranged ship mounted weapons and the defensive capabilities of the ships were overwhelmed by offensive strikes. If and/or when these conditions change, it could be the end of the carrier.
The big thing is going to be what is the future mission of the Navy - and how much it is needed. If the US becomes energy independent due to shale oil and gas, do we need to patrol the Persian Gulf? What other changes are on the horizon and will affect missions and/or force structure?
Part of the problem with building CVL's is the same reason many in the Navy resisted the Sea Control Ship in the 70's, it'll cannibalize the funding for the CVN fleet itself. Instead of 10-11 CVN's we will end up with a lot less and a few CVL's instead because a carrier is a carrier, right?
I have the same concerns that people (cough, USAF) will say exactly that - thus the reason to list the CVL's as the centerpiece of the ARG, they just happen to have catapults.... But yes, same concerns...