Nuclear Triad video from PBS

[Randy Daytona]

Just caught this on the PBS News Hour. Navy has got to replace missile subs, the Air Force wants to replace missiles and bombers (bombers again)

http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/as-pentagon-overhauls-nuclear-triad-critics-advise-caution/

 

[Uncle Fester]

My understanding was always that the concept of the Triad was a rationalization for not giving any one service a piece of the nuke mission, back when that was the only game in town. Given the problems the AF has had with its missile guys and the cost of getting the LRSB nuke-certified, I have a feeling the Ohio Replacement will wind up being the only program fully funded.

 

[robav8r]

I have a feeling the Ohio Replacement will wind up being the only program fully funded.

I wouldn't be surprised if that was the case. The re-cap cost for the entire triad is staggering to say the least . . . . .

http://www.defensenews.com/story/de...on-costs-bomber-icbm-submarine-lrso/79788670/

 

[Flash]

My understanding was always that the concept of the Triad was a rationalization for not giving any one service a piece of the nuke mission, back when that was the only game in town. Given the problems the AF has had with its missile guys and the cost of getting the LRSB nuke-certified, I have a feeling the Ohio Replacement will wind up being the only program fully funded.

It also has to do with flexibility and survivability too, it wasn't just so the USAF and Navy could get a share of the nuke funding pie and prestige though that was a secondary benefit. Bombers provide the maximum flexibility in launching and targeting while the number and dispersal of our ICBM's provide an insurmountable targeting problem. Every one of our ICBM's has to be individually targeted even with nukes in order to destroy them, an almost impossible task given the fact we have over 400 of them.

I doubt the SSBN's are the only ones funded, especially when it would mean putting all our nuke 'eggs' in just a few baskets. While the Navy likes to brag about the survivability of the SSBN's there are only a handful that are deployed at one time, it is a lot harder to destroy 400 targets than 4-6. No matter how stealthy subs are the sheer numbers of ICBM's ensures their deterrent value even if we reduce our current force by half or more.

I wouldn't be surprised if that was the case. The re-cap cost for the entire triad is staggering to say the least . . . . .

http://www.defensenews.com/story/de...on-costs-bomber-icbm-submarine-lrso/79788670/

I have seen estimates that the new SSBN's could eat a massive amount of the Navy's shipbuilding budget, a big reason Congress has pushed the 'National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund' mentioned in the article make it separate from the rest of Navy's budget.

 

[Gatordev]

The good news is that the Ohio replacement won't come out of the Navy's budget, but will come out of the overall service's Triad budget, so the main Navy budget consumer (NAVAIR) isn't going to have to compete with SSBN(X). Or at least not directly. Still, lots of bucks.

ETA: Flash beat me to it. It's not a proposal anymore. It will be separate.

 

[Uncle Fester]

It also has to do with flexibility and survivability too, it wasn't just so the USAF and Navy could get a share of the nuke funding pie and prestige though that was a secondary benefit. Bombers provide the maximum flexibility in launching and targeting while the number and dispersal of our ICBM's provide an insurmountable targeting problem. Every one of our ICBM's has to be individually targeted even with nukes in order to destroy them, an almost impossible task given the fact we have over 400 of them.

I doubt the SSBN's are the only ones funded, especially when it would mean putting all our nuke 'eggs' in just a few baskets. While the Navy likes to brag about the survivability of the SSBN's there are only a handful that are deployed at one time, it is a lot harder to destroy 400 targets than 4-6. No matter how stealthy subs are the sheer numbers of ICBM's ensures their deterrent value even if we reduce our current force by half or more.

I have seen estimates that the new SSBN's could eat a massive amount of the Navy's shipbuilding budget, a big reason Congress has pushed the 'National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund' mentioned in the article make it separate from the rest of Navy's budget.

No, I get the strategy. I was saying that it started out as giving all the services a piece of the nuke mission, back in Ike's day when the Bomb was going to be the only weapon we'd ever need. There were lots of other attempts to 'diversify' the nuclear force...Davy Crockett nuclear artillery shells, Heavy Attack off the Boat and the Seamaster seaplane bomber...but the bomber/boomer/silos triad was what endured. As the Soviet capability matured, the nuke force became less about a big stick and more about survivable retaliatory capability. The Missile Gap/Bomber Gap was mostly public-consumption hysteria; DoD and the Intel community and every president from Ike on knew perfectly well what the Russians had and didn't have. The Soviet ICBM force didn't become a credible threat until the '70's.

There are certainly reasons why it's a workable strategy. The question now is can we afford to maintain it? How much deterrence is enough? What do we keep if we can't afford to keep it all? If it's strictly about credible deterrence, do we need 'offensive' nuke bomber capability?

 

[Flash]

...There are certainly reasons why it's a workable strategy. The question now is can we afford to maintain it? How much deterrence is enough? What do we keep if we can't afford to keep it all? If it's strictly about credible deterrence, do we need 'offensive' nuke bomber capability?

All good questions, and ones folks in charge seem to be asking. I think we could draw down our nuke force a lot to about 100-150 ICBM's, 8-10 SSBN's and one type of bomber I think would be enough off the top of my head.

One reason to keep the bombers would be as 'proportional response' option as a deterrent, smaller nuke powers like North Korea wouldn't necessarily rate an ICBM if they set off a small nuke and Russia using a nuclear-tipped GLCM to take out a base doesn't mean we respond with an SLBM. I have seen it argued that Russia could be even more tempted to use a small nuke if our only nuclear response option was massive retaliation, especially since Russia uses nukes much more as an integral cornerstone of their national defense strategy than we do. Would we really risk a full-scale nuclear war if Russia nuked a few NATO bases in Poland and Romania?

Also firing either an SLBM or ICBM would also raise the alarm almost immediately to our enemies and escalate things in an instant, Russia and China would have to decide in mere minutes whether that nuke missile we just launched is headed to North Korea or them. It paints them into an almost impossible corner. Who is going to notice a cruise missile launched from the middle of the ocean?

A lot of this has to do with nuke strategy though and how we would intend to use nukes as a deterrent, and there has been and continues to be ample debate on that.

 

[Uncle Fester]

I recently re-read Command and Control, which is a fantastic book that covers pretty much everything having to do with US nuke strategy, security, and policy, while still readable for the layman and not being overly wonky. I strongly recommend it, and it's very relevant to this debate.