BLUF- I’m of the opinion that Marine Aviation will not exist except as a shadow of itself in say ~ 30-50 years.
My opinion- Over the course of the last several decades as global threats have continued to emerge and develop, specifically those now coined as “peer competitors,” the utility and technological edge once held by US and coalition air power is eroding. I see this especially true in the Marine Corps with antiquated assets and a limited budget share. As is, the force struggles to support its legacy platforms and I wonder how it affords follow on FVL acquisition and employment?
The current Commandant has already called into question the current MAGTF structure, ship to shore doctrine, and the amphibious elements (LHD/ LPD’s) that go with them. If that goes then I see Marine aviation going as well. The whole idea of the “ACE” is to provide support and risk mitigation to the Marine ground force and without the niche role of amphibious warefare where will the Marine Corps find itself as a fighting force and what’s the point of it’s redundant airframes?
To be clear, I’m not arguing the validity of current or future threat assessments, or ARG/ MEU effectiveness in the future fight, but instead taking the commandants direction at face value and making the point that if the Corps goes down that road, I believe the USMC and ACE will look very different once her current aviation assets reach the end of their life cycle, if not before. The future reality of lean fiscal times, and a difficult to define USMC mission, make for a tough sell if the ACE is only providing redundant mission capabilities as her sister services. And while the current size is congressionally mandated, that is subject to change if required.
Thoughts?
My opinion- Over the course of the last several decades as global threats have continued to emerge and develop, specifically those now coined as “peer competitors,” the utility and technological edge once held by US and coalition air power is eroding. I see this especially true in the Marine Corps with antiquated assets and a limited budget share. As is, the force struggles to support its legacy platforms and I wonder how it affords follow on FVL acquisition and employment?
The current Commandant has already called into question the current MAGTF structure, ship to shore doctrine, and the amphibious elements (LHD/ LPD’s) that go with them. If that goes then I see Marine aviation going as well. The whole idea of the “ACE” is to provide support and risk mitigation to the Marine ground force and without the niche role of amphibious warefare where will the Marine Corps find itself as a fighting force and what’s the point of it’s redundant airframes?
To be clear, I’m not arguing the validity of current or future threat assessments, or ARG/ MEU effectiveness in the future fight, but instead taking the commandants direction at face value and making the point that if the Corps goes down that road, I believe the USMC and ACE will look very different once her current aviation assets reach the end of their life cycle, if not before. The future reality of lean fiscal times, and a difficult to define USMC mission, make for a tough sell if the ACE is only providing redundant mission capabilities as her sister services. And while the current size is congressionally mandated, that is subject to change if required.
Thoughts?
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