Future of helo land

[Gatordev]

There was some talk of a forward firing gun at one point...but think that got swapped for some nifty moving map thingy...I will never understand the whole funding thing I think.....

I think another part of the equation was that everyone wanted a forward firing gun (not just HC), and NAVAIR said to wait. A year or two went by, and at this last OAG conference, the weapon eggheads got up and told everyone that they didn't want a forward firing gun, to which everyone said "Riiiiight." Then they showed them the LOGIR demo, and everyone agreed they wanted that. So the FFG (not the ship) was "replaced" by LOGIR.

At least that's the story my skipper gave us after he went to the conference.

 

[Stearmann4]

We'll be at NASNI 23-29 July if any of you rotorheads want to get together for a beer and solve the RW problems of the world. PM me for details.

 

[ChuckMK23]

Yeah left my post vague on purpose....but without proper ASE gear nobody goes feet dry....

There was some talk of a forward firing gun at one point...but think that got swapped for some nifty moving map thingy...I will never understand the whole funding thing I think.....

The whole SOCOM and helo debate has been done over and over again...basically SOCOM wants a dedicated asset from the Navy (as in when they use Navy Helos they want to be in total control of them), but the Battle Group commanders wont give their assets up...so for now HCS picks up the slack.....

Sorry but in my experience you are wrong on this. Nothing personal - but your message is a bit of a cop out.

It goes much deeper than "who tasks what when". What is IS about is a complete lack of warrior ethos in the Navy Helo O-5/0-6 and Flag ranks - these guys right here and right now are not doing the job they should be doing - plain and simple. There. I've said it... I know personally a lot of these guys - served under them and went through flight school with the majority of guys/gals who are 0-5's now. It's not their fault personally - they genuinly feel like it's not their job to go into direct combat - and they were trained to always say they are not funded to the capability. More importantly it's a cultural flaw in the Navy Helo world.

These folks in turn were nuggets under the post vietnam era guys who gave us the calamity at Desert One. The Navy Helo community lost all credibility after this (sheer negligance and cowardice by a few of the HM 53 drivers.. if you want more on this see Paul Ryan's excellent book by the Naval Institute Press " The Iranian Rescue Mission: Why It Failed ")

SOrry NOSWO - you are echoing the standard party line as a JO in yoiur community - and in some aspects you are not altogether wrong. I'm not trying to start a flame war - but you guys who can make a difference - you folks need to push back a little and challenge your chain of command on these issues. NHA is an excellent forum for this. But don't add to the never endoing string of hypotheticals either..decide you are going to do something: write a solid well conceived point paper, publish it in Proceedings (even without your chain of command approval), ask HARD questions of the Flag Panel at NHA, talk up your capabilities topeople, find the right flag aids to bend their ear and talk-up a TacAir admiral, start a dialog with the folks down at Hurlburt, get your OPS O to schedule form flights or whatever with USMC, USAF, Army, etc.

Cheers

 

[Cyclic]

The Navy Helo community lost all credibility after this (sheer negligance and cowardice by a few of the HM 53 drivers.. if you want more on this see Paul Ryan's excellent book by the Naval Institute Press " The Iranian Rescue Mission: Why It Failed ")

Haven't read that book but what do you mean by that?
Those RH-53D were from HM-16 at Norfolk but they were flown by Marine pilots, HM guys at that time went through HM-12 (Navy FRS) vice HMT-302 (Marine FRS) , they didn't have the training to do that kind of mission.

I think you all have good points all correct, it depends on the perspective. All I can attest right now is that we are here to support the CSG/ESG...that's it, and all requirements revolve around that, for NSW if it's not an oil rig, ship, port or maybe an embassy or location close to shore we're stretching our capabilities, anything beyond that it's SOCOM, that's why they exist, that's why Army and USAF has their Spec Ops, but they'll utilize SEALs as they see fit.

Does it go beyon that? Of course that's why HSC squadrons have existed since the disestablishment of the HAL squadrons. But you guys have to have something clear, the main requirement and the driver for Blk III Armed Helo is CSAR, not NSW.

 

[ChuckMK23]

Haven't read that book but what do you mean by that?
Those RH-53D were from HM-16 at Norfolk but they were flown by Marine pilots, HM guys at that time went through HM-12 (Navy FRS) vice HMT-302 (Marine FRS) , they didn't have the training to do that kind of mission.

The mission started out with all the HAC's coming from HM-12. The CO of the squadron was tasked with poroviding the actual aircraft as well - and he selected 7 "hanger queens" because he personally felth slighted at not being included in the mission planning. Navy pilots flew all the mission rehersals and initial training - and I believe a number 4 or 5 actually flew on the mission. Here is a quote..

"These events revealed two issues. Firstly, was there a lack of pilot resolve in the decision to reverse the course of Helo Number Five? This was the most controversial issue to come out of post-mortem analyses.26 Secondly, if it had been decided ex ante to proceed with no less than six helicopters, why did the administration later consider proceeding with five? Was there a breakdown in decision-making discipline?

Beckwith was reputed to have blamed the pilots for the failure of the mission. His account, admittedly riddled with the fallible wisdom of perfect hindsight, describes the mental shakiness he had observed in some of the pilots. Furthermore, when a helicopter had collided with a C-130 fixed-wing plane and exploded during the withdrawal from the scene (after the mission had been aborted), the helicopter pilots had abandoned their helicopters and left the aircraft there (containing money, maps, documents and so on) without taking time to destroy their aircraft and hence maintain security. Beckwith had called them "cowards".27

"

 

[Cyclic]

You're right, it was a mix of Marine and Navy pilots, I guess the fact that they were there tends to be overshadowed. Funny though that COL Beckwith would say that when Marines were calling the shots, and the fact on the whole planning that the only thing HM pilots did at that time was tow AMCM gear...c'mon...

Here's a good link a salty friend just sent me http://rescueattempt.tripod.com/id15.html