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Transition to FTS

SynixMan

HKG Based Artificial Excrement Pilot
pilot
Contributor
Great background, thanks. Hard to tell where Navy Reserve is heading these days.

CNR’s Warfighting Instructions is littered with “operationalizing the Reserve,” “warfighting is our number one and only priority,” “build units of action” that directly contribute to GPC, and “eliminate reserve capacity that adds little or no enabling or direct warfighting contribution,” etc. Meanwhile, recent O5/O6 TAR selection results and other budgetary and force structure decisions (divesting of Reserve hardware units) seem to be heading the opposite direction.

The hardware units are expensive to run and there's no more "hand me down" airframes for economies of scale like during the Cold War. We've SLEPed the wings on Charlie Hornets so many fucking times just to meet GWOT requirements. They keep finding F-16s and F-5s somehow, but even those will have an end when the T-45 replacement comes online. Seems the idea is we augment the AC in stuff like the FRS/Low Intensity Exped gigs during the "big war" so the AC can go forward at the tactical level or we're plugging into Operational Level and higher commands.

I'm not in a flying job anymore, but I like the focus back to the high end fight and away from Sandy-stan places. Breaking the back of the AC to keep presence in the Middle East "just in case Iran does something" isn't sustainable.
 

red_stang65

Well-Known Member
pilot
The hardware units are expensive to run and there's no more "hand me down" airframes for economies of scale like during the Cold War. We've SLEPed the wings on Charlie Hornets so many fucking times just to meet GWOT requirements. They keep finding F-16s and F-5s somehow, but even those will have an end when the T-45 replacement comes online. Seems the idea is we augment the AC in stuff like the FRS/Low Intensity Exped gigs during the "big war" so the AC can go forward at the tactical level or we're plugging into Operational Level and higher commands.

I'm not in a flying job anymore, but I like the focus back to the high end fight and away from Sandy-stan places. Breaking the back of the AC to keep presence in the Middle East "just in case Iran does something" isn't sustainable.
Fair points about maintaining C-model Hornets, especially when the alternatives are much more expensive airframes for VFA/VFC units that don’t deploy operationally, when cheaper airframes can be used for threat representation (as long as we aren’t required to have them deployable).

I’m referencing more of the HSC/HSM variety, where the airframes are still relevant, operated more cheaply than their AC counterparts for the same tasking, and deploy operationally on a routine basis to offload AC capacity constraints at a reduced cost.

Reducing hardware inventory in these mission areas (and 99% of Reserve representation in HSC) seems like a strange move given strategic guidance (DoD, Navy, and Navy Reserve). Unless the vision is a CNAFR inventory comprised of only VR and Adversary support? Just not sure how much “strategic depth” or “surge capacity” that gives the Navy. It’s ok, though, since the USAF isn’t cutting any of its Guard/Reserve inventory in fighter/attack/rotary…right? Wait a sec…
 

MIDNJAC

is clara ship
pilot
Fair points about maintaining C-model Hornets, especially when the alternatives are much more expensive airframes for VFA/VFC units that don’t deploy operationally, when cheaper airframes can be used for threat representation (as long as we aren’t required to have them deployable).

Well we done killed that, VFC-12 got rhinos, -13 taking delivery of C/D Vipers (jealous, gonna be mucho better than the old NSAWC/NAWDC A/Bs), and -204 transitioned to F-5s (enduring question mark on that one, or why we even have F-5s at all in 2022).
 

Gatordev

Well-Known Member
pilot
Site Admin
Contributor
Reducing hardware inventory in these mission areas (and 99% of Reserve representation in HSC) seems like a strange move given strategic guidance (DoD, Navy, and Navy Reserve). Unless the vision is a CNAFR inventory comprised of only VR and Adversary support? Just not sure how much “strategic depth” or “surge capacity” that gives the Navy. It’s ok, though, since the USAF isn’t cutting any of its Guard/Reserve inventory in fighter/attack/rotary…right? Wait a sec…

Regardless of whatever CNR's mission statements may look like, I get the impression from chatting with my buddy at MSW that CNAFR isn't necessarily happy with the draw downs and they're just trying to tread water long enough for some funding to come back. Not that they aren't actively trying to support, but that they understand you can only go so far.

It's good that the fighter dudes are at least getting some new hardware. I do wonder (with ZERO knowledge on the subject) if diverting the money from a F-5 squadron back to HSC/HSM might be more valuable, given the throughput that the SAUs can offer, the operational commitments of -85, and the regular legitimate operational tasking -60 gets.
 

SynixMan

HKG Based Artificial Excrement Pilot
pilot
Contributor
Fair points about maintaining C-model Hornets, especially when the alternatives are much more expensive airframes for VFA/VFC units that don’t deploy operationally, when cheaper airframes can be used for threat representation (as long as we aren’t required to have them deployable).

I’m referencing more of the HSC/HSM variety, where the airframes are still relevant, operated more cheaply than their AC counterparts for the same tasking, and deploy operationally on a routine basis to offload AC capacity constraints at a reduced cost.

Reducing hardware inventory in these mission areas (and 99% of Reserve representation in HSC) seems like a strange move given strategic guidance (DoD, Navy, and Navy Reserve). Unless the vision is a CNAFR inventory comprised of only VR and Adversary support? Just not sure how much “strategic depth” or “surge capacity” that gives the Navy. It’s ok, though, since the USAF isn’t cutting any of its Guard/Reserve inventory in fighter/attack/rotary…right? Wait a sec…

I get what you're saying, but it's expensive as a budget line item (in a way embarked deployments aren't) and doesn't get them much. The great "HSC-84/85 debate of ~2014", plus various GWOT commitments (or lack thereof), have essentially told me that The Flags don't want to be in the business of over extending, especially to land based commitments. HSC-5's PR Det to northern Iraq was specifically cited by AirBoss at NHA of being a one-off they didn't want to do again. 84/85/TSU/whatever they're called now have been on-again/off-again killed in various iterations. @hscs and @insanebikerboy had front row seats to some of that.

I'm with you, I think CNAF(or R) should maintain that capability, but Sierras don't have the operational reach, it's extremely expensive to man/train/equip, and doesn't fit well in the current conflict structures. They Navy has what they need to do low-threat overwater and overland PR/SOF, and anything else is someone else's bag. VR is needed and VFC is trying to limp to a replacement jet.

As for HSM-60 and reserve HSM in general, I can't speak to it.
 

hscs

Registered User
pilot
I get what you're saying, but it's expensive as a budget line item (in a way embarked deployments aren't) and doesn't get them much. The great "HSC-84/85 debate of ~2014", plus various GWOT commitments (or lack thereof), have essentially told me that The Flags don't want to be in the business of over extending, especially to land based commitments. HSC-5's PR Det to northern Iraq was specifically cited by AirBoss at NHA of being a one-off they didn't want to do again. 84/85/TSU/whatever they're called now have been on-again/off-again killed in various iterations. @hscs and @insanebikerboy had front row seats to some of that.

I'm with you, I think CNAF(or R) should maintain that capability, but Sierras don't have the operational reach, it's extremely expensive to man/train/equip, and doesn't fit well in the current conflict structures. They Navy has what they need to do low-threat overwater and overland PR/SOF, and anything else is someone else's bag. VR is needed and VFC is trying to limp to a replacement jet.

As for HSM-60 and reserve HSM in general, I can't speak to it.
I would argue that the hardware units fit nicely into current world conflicts between EABO (-85) and Russian submarine development (-60/VP). Would be nice to have other capabilities that have long since been cut to prevent constant ISIC changes in CVWs and ‘other’ current non-standard support.
 

Gatordev

Well-Known Member
pilot
Site Admin
Contributor
As for HSM-60 and reserve HSM in general, I can't speak to it.

-60 at this point is mostly treated like another squadron, albeit with a bullpen that isn't very deep. If their schedule fits into an expeditionary requirement, they can be fair game. Historically they've also been the only one available for short-notice tasking for things that hscs is alluding to. From the ISIC's standpoint, they're a valuable relief valve...or at least have been for the last several years.
 

red_stang65

Well-Known Member
pilot
I get what you're saying, but it's expensive as a budget line item (in a way embarked deployments aren't) and doesn't get them much.
To do the mission as directed, a blended AC/RC unit will always be cheaper than an all AC unit tasked with the same requirement. Plenty of history, studies, and attempts prove that out. Also, tasking an AC unit pulls them from their other commitments to supporting a ship (CSG, ESG, LCS, etc.).

Doesn’t get them much? Compared to what? An EXP HSC squadron costs a good deal more to operate per year, but doesn’t provide nearly the amount of training support at home. As for operational return on investment, how many flight hours are LCS dets getting per deployment? Now that’s a lot of cost for not much gain.

Alternatively, when the AC is constantly begging for relief from all the other non-deployment tasking, or when Navy has to pass up on any number of GCC requests for helos because their inventory’s already spoken for, then why not task -85 to do something else besides SOF (ala HSM-60)? It’s not like they came up with their mission on their own—they’re doing what they’ve been directed to do.

It's good that the fighter dudes are at least getting some new hardware. I do wonder (with ZERO knowledge on the subject) if diverting the money from a F-5 squadron back to HSC/HSM might be more valuable, given the throughput that the SAUs can offer, the operational commitments of -85, and the regular legitimate operational tasking -60 gets.

Both the HSM and HSC SAUs are gone—shut down in FY21 or 22 I think.
 

Gatordev

Well-Known Member
pilot
Site Admin
Contributor
Both the HSM and HSC SAUs are gone—shut down in FY21 or 22 I think.

I know, that was the point of my posit. Again, this is a question and not a statement, but does a F-5 squadron provide as much value as an aggressor squadron compared to the SAUs and the other helo squadrons, all of which have had significant cutbacks (or disestablishments)? The answer may be a resounding yes, but I don't know.

To get a true answer, obviously you'd have to remove the politics and rice bowls out of the picture, which is probably not a realistic expectation.
 
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