The Great Growler Gallery

From what I can find it was Captain Chuck 'Sly' Magill who was attached to the 58th Fighter Squadron flying F-15's. He shot down a MiG-29 with an AIM-7 on the first day of the war. This book, on my short list to buy, should have a good description of the engagement in it.

The last Marine ace was an exchange guy too, Major John Bolt. He shot down 6 MiG-15's flying USAF F-86's in Korea to add to the 6 Zeros he shot down in WWII. John Glenn also shot down 3 MiG's in Korea with the USAF as well.

Wouldn't be without precedent either, don't think the AF does it's own depot level MX on the 60.

It actually is the JFACC who will make that determination who gets what missions. The GCC will only weigh in in the very beginning when providing commander's intent in the planning process or when the components don't get along.

I think we are in agreement here that the Air Force needs to be involved in the EA mission. The Air Force needs to keep the capability in the event they go to a platform other than the F-35 to do EA. I realize this would take some $$$ but you could modify an F-15E to cover the mission in the same way they modified F-16's to do it.

At the same time, what does a 2 star tell all his WSO's; sorry, we had to cancel the B-52 EA variant, so now your career is dead and you need to find employment elsewhere?

In my view, the Air Force is always thinking about how to adjust future funding lines to get the programs they want. Maj Gen Scott is the Requirement Director for the Air Force Staff, so his job is to be thinking about future acquisitions and keep those desires in the public view to effect future funding streams.

Most Air Force leadership is generally in lock-step with the Service position when it comes to acquisition; the F-22 is a classic example of the Air Force directing all efforts towards one program. They are better than the Navy since they don't have three siblings known as Aviation, Surface and Subs all fighting for their piece of one pie.

It would not be the first time that has happened in the military.


When the Army got rid of the Cobra and transitioned all the pilots there were a lot of guys left out in the cold and simply burned to the end of their commitment without the option to move on. (One of the Flight Commanders from LSI down here at Rucker was one of them)

Even worse was when the Army instituted a policy that you could not advance beyond CW2 without an advanced aircraft qualification. The 58A/C was not considered an advanced aircraft and when they got rid of that there were IP's who were told they would not be transitioning (Clinton Era drawdowns) and to add to it they wouldnt be promoting while they spent the remainder of their commitment stuck at Ft Rucker training Aviators to do the same job they were qualified for. (Again several of them running around down here at Rucker)

If for some reason the Air Farce would consider buying their own number of Growlers there's no way in hell they'd allow Navy Mechs to maintain there jets.

Speaking from experience while I was a SELRES I looked into transferring from VP-66 to the F-16C/D equiped 126th FW, WI ANG. I had at the time 8 years of experience as an AO in F-14's, Ships Weapons & P-3's but that wasn't good enough. The Recruiter told me the Air Force doesn't allow anyone to touch their airplanes until they've been to an USAF tech school.

The COCOM is supposed to ask for capabilities, not specific platforms. They ask for 50 fighter/attack aircraft, not 30 USAF, 20 Navy and 10 Marine fighter/attack aircraft. JFCOM is the one who goes to the services and asks what is available then sources out the request. But when the COCOM asks for tankers there is only one place JFCOM can go, our boys with the scarves.

You have also proven my point, it is the COCOM that is in charge of the assets, not the services. The services are just force providers nowadays, the ultimate authority for ops in a COCOM is the four-star who is in charge. Meaning the KC-135/10's are going to tank whoever the hell he tells them too. It would also make any supposed service specific agreements moot, if they ever existed.

I think the Air Force does need to be more involved in the EA mission, but they aren't and that is unlikely to change anytime soon. Whatever EWO's, not WSO's, had EA as their primary mission are a rare and dying breed in the USAF. In reality the only guys left who do it full time are B-52 EWO's. The other EWO's in the USAF are mainly ES guys, who fly very big planes and aren't EA oriented (there is a big difference, I did both). So it is not like there are a lot of guys who are going to be left without a career if the USAF doesn't get it's act together on EA. I bet less than a score, and they are nearing retirement.

So to argue that a tiny handful of guys who happen to do a PEP tour with the Navy VAQ squadrons is going to keep the USAF in the EA business is pretty laughable and belies the General's lack of knowledges.

The USAF's single-mindedness is as much of a detriment to them as it is a benefit. It is a bit like group-think, with many other critical warfare areas being left to atrophy. Why else would the USAF two-star in charge of the Joint ISR agency be a fighter pilot, three times in a row? Why not a RC-135 or U-2 type? Not many of those guys with stars on their shoulders. The only reason that some areas of the Air Force that are not part of the fighter-attack mission thrive is that they are not funded with service dollars but with big DOD money. The Navy is far from perfect, but there is a reason we still retain a robust EA capability while the world's premier Air Force has hardly any capability to speak of, either equipment or personnel.

Many of the old EF-4/111 WSOs transitioned to the F-15E as WSOs; we also have the RC-135 as Flash mentioned and the EC-130 variants. Beyond that there are staff jobs for EW planning, test, coordination, etc. as well as the new AF nav school teaching all the navs the EW syllabus will create a lot of openings for EWO instructors.

I (or the collective we) just learned in the JAOC2C course at Hurlburt USTRANSCOM/AMC still maintains OPCON of all tanker assets, Not the Combatant Commander. The reason being is that there simply is not enough assets to dedicate to the Combatant Commanders, because they must also fulfill other missions in other Areas of Responsibility. It actually takes authorization from the SecDef to to transfer OPCON to a CCDR/JFACC, and apparently it doesn't happen very often at all. They may be briefly be given TACON, which happens more often, but it's still only for a short period of time.

It's a very strange, fuzzy and convoluted way they get added to the ATO, and how they are integrated into the JFACC's plan... It took about 1.5 hours of powerpoint hell to explain, and I'm sure 90% of the class (including me) doesn't totally understand it. It's an AF 4 star who is in charge of USTRANSCOM (and pretty much always has been), So really the argument could have some ground, albeit most likely not in any official sense but perhaps more of a backyard handshake between politicians.

Don't forget the possible backseat WSO openings in the next generation E/A Jammer Predator model. I heard they are working on a tandem model to be implemented in a remote trailer in the desert so when the pilot has to take a quick piss the WSO can take over for a few minutes.

Seems that the AF is pumping alot of money not only into the F-22 but also um-maned planes, "drones". Definitely the future of military aviation sad to say it though.

The only ones who make a living doing Electronic Attack are the B-52 EWO's, a drop in the bucket to what used to be. The rest are just scattered remnants of a once robust EA force, doing ES or something else, but not EA.

That may be the theory and a bit of the practice, but in reality TRANSCOM is doesn't take tankers off OEF duty much at all. When they do it is for short durations and only for special missions, approved by the SECDEF. If the COCOM wants they usually get and TRANSCOM deals with it, the joy of being a supporting command.

Eh... politicians not so much as elected officials but as a couple of 4 stars saying, " i have this, you want that, let's help each other out." However I'd really like to see the AF pull any tanker support from where it's really needed. I'm sure that's a quick way for USTRANSCOM to lose an asset.


AMC really runs the air show for TRANSCOM the same way a JFACC runs the air for a Combatant Commander. Ultimately TRANSCOM owns the assets but AMC is who makes it happen.

From what I understand the SECDEF signs the DEPORD but when they deploy they don't go under the command of the Combatant Commander (confused yet?) Instead they refer to the way they operate as a "Common User" system. The AF trains, equips, and executes but the J-3/J-4 from both the functional and the geographic commander get to fight over who has priority. They mentioned some type of JCS priority system, but the bottom line is those guys really have 2 bosses, the theater commander and the functional commander. The Theater Commander wants control of everything there, and the Functional Commander wants control because he serves and fulfills missions worldwide.

So the JFACC tells AMC that he needs tanker support in a certain place at a certain time and AMC tells him whether or not an asset will be available. But the JFACC can't tell AMC to have a tanker at a certain place and time. Unless the SecDef specifically signs over OPCON to the Theater Commander. (Or Combatant Commander, or Joint Forces Commander, or... why must we have 8 names for the same dude?!)


I'm study this stuff right now (ebooks are cool), and a lot of it is swimming in my head, but this is how I have come to understand it.

Someone in the class said something about how EW may turn this same way if one service owns all the EW capability and has to serve more than one customer.

Yeah, my operational experience is zero. Just learning about the joint world makes my head implode. I just find it interesting that TRANSCOM has the ability to tell the COCOM no if they really wanted to. (Again, probably a good way to lose control of the asset all together.)

This discussion feels like on that may easily dip into classified territory so I totally get it if the answer isn't appropriate for the forum.

What was the AF reasoning for dropping tactical EA, and especially given the F-117 shootdown and Cope India results, continuing to ignore tactical EA?
And is modern jamming capability something we might also want integrated on our fighters as well, similar to what the Sukhoi's do?

We were told that if the expeds do get the Growler, the USAF will most likely be contributing money. As so, they will want to continue sending guys over, but at that point it will only be F-15 WSO's.

To pile on to the discussion, the Request for Forces (RFF) / Request for Capabilities (RFC) process flows like this:
If a JTF Commander (GEN Odierno for example) needs a force/capability, he sends an RFF to the Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC) requesting that capability.

First, allow me to put on my Joint Doctrine Weenie hat and say that COCOM is a level of command, like OPCON or TACON, NOT a person. The Combatant Commanders are the Geographic Combatant Commanders (abbreviated doctrinally as GCC or CCDR) and the Functional Combatant Commanders (JFCOM, STRATCOM, TRANSCOM and SOCOM).

Second, an RFF is kind of a misnomer, you don't request a Navy EOD Mobile Unit, you request a capability. For example, you need the capability to conduct C-IED operations and explosive handling as well as a command element to control such operations. This could be sourced with a USN Mobile Unit or maybe a USA Engineering Company.

The RFF goes to CENTCOM in this case. If CENTCOM has the capability, then he provides it. If he doesn't (which is usually the case since CENTCOM has almost no Assigned forces) the RFF goes to JCS.

Here it is 'validated' by the Joint Staff as something that is important and then it goes to the 'Force Provider'. For conventional forces it goes to JFCOM. For SOF, SOCOM. For Tankers and Strat Lift, TRANSCOM. For Space, ISR or things that leave a mushroom cloud, STRATCOM.

In JFCOMs case, he will look to the Service Components to provide these forces. The Service Components are Fleet Forces Command (USN), Air Combat Command (USAF), MARFORCOM (USMC) and FORCECOM (USA).

The Force Provider uses DRRS to determine what unit has sufficient readiness to deploy and makes the recommendation to the Global Force Management Board at the JCS.

The GFMB looks at what the Force Provider recommends as the sourcing solution from the Force Provider and allows the other GCCs and the services to object to that unit being recommended for deployment.

The GFMB takes all the considerations into play and makes the recommendation to SECDEF who will sign the Deployment Order (DEPORD) and now the unit deploys and is 'Attatched' to CENTCOM.

CENTCOM will get OPCON of forces that flow into that theater. For a force to change COCOM, requires SECDEF approval and a change to the "Forces For" document.

Since the Tankers are a TRANSCOM asset, TRANSCOM will be tasked by the GFMB to provide tanker aircraft to wherever they are needed. The GFMB is the decider of who gets priority over whom.

Once the Tankers role into theater, they are OPCON to CENTCOM, so GEN Patreus can task them to do what needs to be done. GEN Patreus will then provide the capability to the JTF Commander (GEN Odierno in this case), who in turn hands them off to the JFACC to run.

The pass off from Patreus to Odierno to JFACC is transparent but that is how the chain of command works there, so ownership must flow down the chain.

Now GEN Patreus will pass OPCON down to GEN Odierno who in turn will pass it to the JFCACC. One big difference between OPCON and TACON is that OPCON allows you to ‘organize’ personnel, which means you can fire the CO. If you only have TACON of a force, you can’t relieve the CO; you can recommend it to whoever has OPCON, but you can’t do it yourself.

Clear as mud?

Yeah, that's pretty much what they are teaching us. For 8 hours a day, with powerpoint, but it goes further into the nitty gritty of how they talk to eachother, and who can't talk to who but who can and who has a liaison where.

Heh, the one thing that I have learned is that everyone has a liaison, and everyone kind of thinks everyone else is all screwed up in how they do things.

But it's not too bad, the DCA wants us here to get a grasp on what the real world is like, seeing as how everything will be Joint or even Coalition (gone are the days of 1 service 1 theater) it makes sense.


Can't wait to start working on those wings though! 1 month of waiting to start down!

I guess not so much derogatory, but different. It's roundabout. But what I'm saying/typing and what I'm meaning aren't syncing up so it's time it shut up and color.


So about them Growlers...

One of the rules of good staff work and planning is to send out and request LNOs. In addition to bringing expertise and a different perspective to the world, they answer the the 'who the hell do I call' question when stuff arrives.
One of the biggest hassles with staff work is knowing who you should be talking to; with an LNO, you go to him/her and let them reach back to their parent command.

When you get to the Combatant Commander level a lot of times the LNO is a permanently assigned person to another command; so you could be the JFCOM LNO to CENTCOM and be PCS'd to Tampa. Other than some training and occasional meetings in Norfolk, you're in Tampa full-time.

To echo HeyJoe's comments, I was the DOD LNO to the FEMA Team in Jefferson Parrish (LA) during JTF Katrina. It was probably the most personally rewarding deployment I ever did. One reason was that I was almost alone and unafraid. My CO gave me the latitude to do what I think needed to be done and let him know if I needed help.
When you're an LNO, sometimes you get to be making those command decisions because an answer is needed right now and you're the only one with any experience in that mission area.

Plus it's a very good PME opportunity to see how other folks do stuff. My experiences interacting with other services is that they do things differently; not better, not worse, just different. Sometimes you'll think the Navy system is better (IMO, our FITREP system and promotion system is FAR more logical than the Army or Air Force, but that's another discussion) and other times you'll wonder why the Navy refuses to change things.