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Shooting at NAVSEA

BigRed389

Registered User
None
#31
Security guards are meaningless if they are gunned down at the front door. After that, metal detectors simply reassure the gunman that everyone past that point will be unarmed.

Yes, it is pretty sad and pathetic that I am better armed and much safer OFF base as opposed to ON base.
Sure. But there are also compounds and installations (DEVGRU's compound, Pentagon, some overseas bases) that do defense in depth.
 

707guy

"You can't make this shit up..."
#32
I'd say that anyone who is unhinged enough to think about gunning down a bunch of people isn't going to logically factor into the equation whether or not those he is about to kill are armed/unarmed. Once again I'll say that the issue here - just like all these mass shootings - is mental health. Layers and layers of security will not stop another shooter who is fanatically following what he/she views as their destiny.
 

Brett327

Well-Known Member
None
Super Moderator
Contributor
#34
I'd say that anyone who is unhinged enough to think about gunning down a bunch of people isn't going to logically factor into the equation whether or not those he is about to kill are armed/unarmed. Once again I'll say that the issue here - just like all these mass shootings - is mental health. Layers and layers of security will not stop another shooter who is fanatically following what he/she views as their destiny.
Krauthammer, who also happens to be a psychiatrist, wrote a great piece in the Post today about the failings of how our society deals with mental illness.
 

RiseR 25

Active Member
#36
Judging off a news interview about this guy with some people who apparently saw him at the airport, you could clearly see that something was bothering him and he was experiencing a very high level of paranoia. That being said it seems it still would have been very difficult for safeguards to pick this up. There was a flip side to him and he seemed like a very polite man in some social settings as well as in the workplace. So absolutely I can see how this was missed.

As far as alternative to make bases "safer," I don't know because it seems like there are more than enough safeguards in today's environment.
 

RiseR 25

Active Member
#37
Judging off a news interview about this guy with some people who apparently saw him at the airport, you could clearly see that something was bothering him and he was experiencing a very high level of paranoia. That being said it seems it still would have been very difficult for safeguards to pick this up. There was a flip side to him and he seemed like a very polite man in some social settings as well as in the workplace. So absolutely I can see how this was missed.

As far as alternative to make bases "safer," I don't know because it seems like there are more than enough safeguards in today's environment.
Sorry let me rephrase. I'm not trying to imply there are enough safeguards. I'm just saying there are a lot already.
 

PhrogLoop

Adulting is hard
pilot
#39
I work in Installations Management now and I can say with certainty that our security force (despite having the largest budget and manning programmatically) is not equipped nor adequately trained to deal with these types of nightmare scenarios. They do what they do pretty damned well: set and maintain FPCONs. But they aren't tactical shooters. We rely on our local, state, and federal partners for a lot of these capabilities through mutual aid agreements and MOA/MOUs. Which is why I am beside myself to hear that the Capitol Police team (very well trained and equipped for this type of scenario) were directed to stand down. Fog of war, maybe. But I was in a meeting this week where a high level type said straight up that it is not realistic for us to think that we can prevent this type of thing from happening again, even after the inevitable knee jerk response. Hopefully we get better at responding and leveraging these partner relationships and C2.
 

MIDNJAC

is clara ship
pilot
#40
Agreed, but I'm curious as to how we apply the curve for shore installation security.

There are obviously differing levels of security at shore installations, even for an engineering/progam mgmt organization like NAVSEA...most recent one I visited had metal detectors at the front door and specially badged gates beyond that. On the other end, there are some that didn't seem to have any armed personnel in the entire building.

Maybe a building like NAVSEA (and NAVAIR) where we have a soft target concentrating a lot of our intellectual capital should have better security than your average NOSC...
Or, to play devil's advocate, maybe we should just accept that random things happen in this world that can't always be predicted and planned for. There are fucking crazy people walking amongst us, thus the inevitable level of chaos in life. I will say that spending an extra 15-20 mins trying to get through the gate each day because of extra knee-jerk security measures is not worth the illusion of protection from a 1 in a million chance incident for me. Base is not some weird realm of the world where you don't potentially have to face life. This isn't meant to minimize the loss of life in this shooting, but the reality of the world is that stuff like this happens everywhere. We are wasting time if we think we can prevent it from ever happening. Like star wars, you can stop maybe 90% of the missiles, but those 10% that statistically will make it through make the whole thing not worth it. Just my .02
 

wink

VS NFO. Blue and Gold Off. Former Recruiter.
None
Super Moderator
Contributor
#41
I work in Installations Management now and I can say with certainty that our security force (despite having the largest budget and manning programmatically) is not equipped nor adequately trained to deal with these types of nightmare scenarios. They do what they do pretty damned well: set and maintain FPCONs. But they aren't tactical shooters. ...
Maj Hassan at Ft Hood was shot by a civilian security officer. I don't know if she was DOD Police or some other flavor of fed civ security type, but I heard her say she was on the base police swat team. So, the Army can get security types that are trained tactical shooters but we can't? Oh, and while recuperating from her gun shot wounds her job was eliminated and she got furloughed.
 

jcj

Registered User
#42
Maj Hassan at Ft Hood was shot by a civilian security officer. I don't know if she was DOD Police or some other flavor of fed civ security type, but I heard her say she was on the base police swat team. So, the Army can get security types that are trained tactical shooters but we can't? Oh, and while recuperating from her gun shot wounds her job was eliminated and she got furloughed.
She was an on duty DOD police officer - and I think also an Army reservist, but she was on duty in her civilian job as a DOD police officer that day. She may be SWAT qualified and part of their SWAT team but I think that situation went down too fast for a formal SWAT response. If I recall correctly (been a while since I've read about the incident) I think she engaged & shot him as one of the "first responder" officers on the scene.

I hadn't heard that her job was eliminated but that really sucks. Perhaps we could have saved enough money to keep her on the job if early in the process Maj. Hasan had accidentally fallen out of the helicopter that was hauling him back & forth between Ft. Hood & the civilian jail daily.

On a serious note, some guys on another board point out that a warship at sea has some officers and enlisted in the duty section armed while standing watch, but this doesn't happen ashore. It's been a long time since I served & probably everything is different but is this a valid point worth discussion? Obviously not a solution for societal issues with gun violence in the United States, but is there a role for arming duty section personnel ashore for force protection? (I realize this would likely not have stopped the Navy Yard tragedy)
 

xj220

Will fly for food.
pilot
Contributor
#43
It's one thing to arm people, it's another for them to be fully trained and able to respond. Just giving someone a gun isn't going to be as effective if they haven't encountered a wide variety of scenarios and are able to place the bullets on target. I think that's a point a lot of people fail to recognize in the "arm everyone" situations.
 

Spekkio

He bowls overhand.
#44
On a serious note, some guys on another board point out that a warship at sea has some officers and enlisted in the duty section armed while standing watch, but this doesn't happen ashore. It's been a long time since I served & probably everything is different but is this a valid point worth discussion?
It happens ashore; however, the guys armed standing watch are even less trained in tactical shooting situations than the guys working the gate that PhrogLoop referenced. They fire a weapon or two a few times at a piece of paper at various ranges, the MA2 (SW) on shore duty at the range does his counting scheme that counts complete misses as a central target hit because they only subtract bullet holes outside of the middle from your total score rather than add up the total hits making it virtually impossible to fail, complete a PQS for the actual watchstation, here you go now go stand watch.

Their main role is to stop unauthorized access to the ship; the weapons are a deterrent more than anything else. They're definitely not trained to take out a crazed gunman out to kill as many people as possible.

So to make allowing AD Sailors on base with firearms worthwhile for the purposes of defending against a madman with a shotgun or rifle, you'd have to severely revamp the firearm PQS and continuing training program. Not sure if it's worth it considering how rarely it occurs.
 
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Flash

SEVAL/ECMO
None
Super Moderator
Contributor
#45
I work in Installations Management now and I can say with certainty that our security force (despite having the largest budget and manning programmatically) is not equipped nor adequately trained to deal with these types of nightmare scenarios. They do what they do pretty damned well: set and maintain FPCONs. But they aren't tactical shooters. We rely on our local, state, and federal partners for a lot of these capabilities through mutual aid agreements and MOA/MOUs. Which is why I am beside myself to hear that the Capitol Police team (very well trained and equipped for this type of scenario) were directed to stand down. Fog of war, maybe. But I was in a meeting this week where a high level type said straight up that it is not realistic for us to think that we can prevent this type of thing from happening again, even after the inevitable knee jerk response. Hopefully we get better at responding and leveraging these partner relationships and C2.
In the years since 9/11 the dozens of law enforcement agencies that reside in DC and surrounding area have gotten A LOT better about working and communicating with each other, personally and over the radios, but still have a ways to go. I think C2 is still a big issue, it can change from block to block in some places in DC. Walking around the Mall and surrounding areas and by doing so passing through the jurisdiction of a dozen or so law enforcement agencies just hints at how hard the problem is for the DC area.