NEWS Recent USN/USMC Mishap rate: Can the Navy Say No?

[ea6bflyr]

Recent article highlighting the mishap trend since OCT 2017. While this trend over a short period is newsworthy, is it really alarming?

 

[Recovering LSO]

What's the Class B and C rate....? I think there's more of story/indicator there.

 

[xj220]

I get notifications of all the HAZREPs and SIRs that come out for all the communities and there's a lot of them, more than I remember there being before. There are certainly a lot of Class Bs and Cs.

 

[Gatordev]

I get notifications of all the HAZREPs and SIRs that come out for all the communities and there's a lot of them, more than I remember there being before. There are certainly a lot of Class Bs and Cs.

But things are also more expensive now, too.

Looking at those Class As, this, to me, is an example of where the Mishap system starts to go off the rails. Is it a "mishap" if you take a bird in the engine? There's no negligent casual factor there (at least as reported in that chart). I'm oversimplifying my statement, but sometimes it's not anyone's fault and something external (usually nature) "just happens."

/Soap box

 

[Flash]

Recent article highlighting the mishap trend since OCT 2017. While this trend over a short period is newsworthy, is it really alarming?

Do three months really constitute a 'trend'?

 

[xj220]

Totally agree but even with birdstrikes, I've seen pilots now check bash reports and avoid airfields where its red. If you get a birdstrike, the questions start coming down as to why you were there and didn't go elsewhere, at least that's what people are trying to avoid.

 

[Recovering LSO]

Mishaps don’t require “negligence.” Sure a/c are getting more expensive, but the alpha threshold also increased to 2M. Is that high enough? Someone thought it was high enough to warrant the bells and whistles that come along with an alpha. It’s true that sometimes things just happen, but I’d offer that situation is fairly rare.

In my opinion the only failing of our current safety system is in actually doing anything useful with the mountains of data they collect. In the world of flag officers, CNSC has about as much pull as the new hinge starting off in safety - next to none. All the collected data in the world doesn’t mean dick if you can’t use it to influence positive change.

Where was the NSC with the stacks and stacks of OBOGS/hypoxia hazreps prior to VT IPs throwing the bullshit flag? Punting to NARGs? Punting to NAVAIR? Punting.

Making CNATRA a two-star billet missed the mark. Make CNSC a two-star/on-track Flag billet with some juice/authority.

//end rant//

 

[Swanee]

Totally agree but even with birdstrikes, I've seen pilots now check bash reports and avoid airfields where its red. If you get a birdstrike, the questions start coming down as to why you were there and didn't go elsewhere, at least that's what people are trying to avoid.

It also funded the study that lead to things like changing BASH procedures. Case in point, when I was in Kingsville, the BASH procedures were changed, as the existing ones actually put us into the thick of the threat from migratory birds. The birdstrike HAZREP and Class D/C/B SIRs had an impact on getting the funding for us to come up with ways to mitigate the issues.

 

[Gatordev]

Totally agree but even with birdstrikes, I've seen pilots now check bash reports and avoid airfields where its red. If you get a birdstrike, the questions start coming down as to why you were there and didn't go elsewhere, at least that's what people are trying to avoid.

I haven't seen that be an issue because of where we originate. Every day is BASH CONDITION HIGH. But again, let's say you hit a bird at a LOW field? It just seems like there's times where something should be a mishap for accounting purposes and other times when it can actually be of value to a community.

Mishaps don’t require “negligence.”

Perhaps community specific, but more often than not, the non-Class A SIRs I read are more concerned with laying blame than actually solving a problem. It's a reason why I am skeptical about SIRs when I read them because so often when I know a little bit about what really happened, you can start to see how the SIR is being steered in a direction (and not necessarily for nefarious reasons).

That said, I'm not saying we need to do away with the process, it just gets frustrating when the process is less than optimal when human beings get involved. I know...such is life.

 

[SynixMan]

I realize this is kinda my soap box, but it’s almost as if a generation of pilots who grew up on a tactical hard deck are less proficient, and thus more dangerous, than their predecessors. Who’dathunkit?

Stay safe out there folks.

 

[RadicalDude]

The crux of the entire article, and arguably our retention/burnout/mishap issue, in general, is here:

"The current Pentagon process effectively gives the joint commanders a blank check for how heavily forces are committed around the world, with little provision for the services to throw a yellow flag and say “too much.” That’s the system Sec. Spencer seems ready to challenge."

Just as I said here:

You guys are ignoring what I’m saying—- we need to reduce our operational commitments. Less WESTPAC, no more 1.0 in the gulf, complete withdraw from AFG. The problem is that we have become used to being at war 24/7/365. This is unrealistic and unsustainable. The manning and equipment issues below this ground truth. We have too much war and not enough shit.

We're operationally overcommitted. Have been for years. Until leadership starts saying "can't," nothing will change.

 

[sevenhelmet]

I'm struggling to see a trend here. There were some notable mishaps during that period, and we definitely have material and personnel problems, but I think this errs on the side of sensationalist reporting.

I realize this is kinda my soap box, but it’s almost as if a generation of pilots who grew up on a tactical hard deck are less proficient, and thus more dangerous, than their predecessors. Who’dathunkit?

Stay safe out there folks.

At least back then we HAD a tactical hard deck. Nobody around Lemoore seems to use that term now. My unit is well below the old "hard deck" number, and I'm flying about 25% less now than I did during maintenance phase in 2009, despite having much younger aircraft. Then again, I am back in the fleet after a pretty long hiatus to shore duty, so what I see is the "before" and "after" picture of years of the same disconnect between tasking and funding levels. It's not pretty.

Workups are going to be interesting.