Air France 447 crash.....possibly found after 2 years

Damn! Where were you when I needed you?

I have flown a couple models of Airbus over two decades, although not the A-330. Nevertheless they all are very similar in design, operation and procedures.

Too bad you couldn't have told me about those "pretty serious design flaws" sooner!"

Wow! I never knew. Otherwise I would never have risked my millions of passengers' lives over those many years!

Add to the very little you know, how many mishaps may have been avoided because you what you call "design flaws." Some of the systems that can confound in rare and stressful circumstances, prevent far more incidents and mishaps in routine operations where distraction, neglect and poor monkey skills are present. You don't read about the third world airline flight NOT flying into the ground or NOT stalling at cruise altitude because of the Airbus design philosophy. The sad truth is that many Airbus aircraft are flown by third world flight crews that are far less well trained and have a fraction of a US or EU crew's experience or training support.

As I pointed out, not a design philosophy thing, Airbus or otherwise. But even to your point, they are not that similar in that the cues the Colgan crew were getting were pretty straight forward and unambiguous to a well trained crew. The Air France incident was far different in that there were conflicting cues and alerts, let alone other factors such as the high altitude, Capt on crew break, etc.

Based on my years of jumpseat riding in Airbuses, each control stick, flap or gear lever is an independant electrical switch/input of some sort. The power levers don't even move when the auto throttles are engaged. Airbus pilots please clarify.

The sidestick controllers are totally separate. Each one sends a separate electronic signal to each of the flight controller computers.
In the case of disagreement or opposite control input, the Captain's sidestick has the authority to override the First Officer's.

FWIW, the sidestick is rarely used and even discouraged, except for T.O. and landing. Even "autoland" was supposed to be done at least once a day.
It is not an airplane. It is a flying computer.

[Edit: Upon furtheer review, the article says the cross-contols average out. So maybe the 330 is different.... or I need to go back to ground school.]

So this is, sadly, another case study in failed CRM. And though we can all sit back and chuck spears, "there are days when you're the ace of the base, and days when you can't find your ass with both hands and a flashlight," to quote my first on-wing in VT-3. But even though we've beaten that to death, one question for the engineers and ATPs in the crowd:

Not to imply that the Airbus series are "suffering from insurmountable design flaws, etc." But who thought it was a good idea to build an airplane where you AVERAGE the inputs from two sets of flight controls and send that to the computers? Either you have the controls or you don't. If you don't have the controls, and you take the controls, it's usually because you believe the other guy is terminally AFU, and you intend to save him from himself, be he a student or whoever. There are right control inputs and wrong control inputs in any given situation. Say, for the sake of argument, I am trimmed up on-speed in the landing pattern in the front seat of a T-45. Notionally, I get a wild hair and decide to plant the stick in my lap. This is heinously wrong, and will afford me less than 15 seconds to live if uncorrected. My theoretical backseater screams like a little girl and yells "Nittany, you f***ing idiot" while slamming the throttle to MRT, going boards in, and shoving the stick to neutral. Notionally, he does this in time to keep the jet from departing controlled flight, and we live. This would be a correct input in this situation. What is gained by averaging out these inputs? Is there ever a reason given in ground school?

99% of the time, Airbusi are flown in "Normal LAW" which means among many other things, the pilot cannot physically stall the aircraft. It also limits "stupid" inputs. But AF447 was in "Alternate LAW" and many protections are no longer available. This is practiced in the sim, but not as a compound emergency which AF447 experienced. The FAA decides how sims are performed, more than any airline for us in the US.

I still believe in my model of Airbus, the capt. had sidestick priority. But a check of the A-330 confirms that opposite controls inputs are averaged. Nevertheless, all Airbus that I know of have a CAUTION whenever there is opposite control input. Pushing that button gives sidestick authority to that pilot. From the A-330 Manual:

When the PF makes a sidestick input, an electrical order is sent to the flight control computers. If the PNF makes a simultaneous sidestick input, both signals are algebraically summed and both PF and PNF green lights flash on the glareshield. This situation might occur in the case of an instinctive PNF reaction on the sidestick. If the PNF needs to take control, he must press and hold the take-over pb in order to avoid simultaneous sidestick inputs and announce, "I have control".

In the case of a SIDESTICK FAULT ECAM warning due to an electrical failure, the affected sidestick order sent to the computers is zeroed. This means that the affected sidestick has been deactivated and there is no further procedure associated with this warning.

In the case of pilot incapacitation where a sidestick input is being made, or in the case of a mechanical failure leading to a jammed sidestick, the inputs are again algebraically summed. There is no associated ECAM caution. In either of these cases, the intervening pilot must press the take-over pb to gain single sidestick authority. The pb must be depressed for at least 40 seconds to permanently deactivate the affected sidestick. However, if a sidestick has been deactivated, it may be reactivated by depressing its take-over pb.

OK, so if you're no-kidding trying to prevent stupidity, there is a mechanism available to take sole control of the aircraft. That makes more sense.

A somewhat disrespectful (but also somewhat true) image of a 'normal' airline captain compared to an Airbus captain:

40 seconds seems like a long time to be holding down the button to gain unilateral control. If you have something like sever turbulence, out of control flight, another pilot to fight or keep off the controls after incapacitation, it might be hard to keep a finger on that button for 40 seconds. 40 seconds is a lifetime when you are upside down in a transport category aircraft hurdling to toward the earth.

Just to clarify:

Unilateral control is immediate when the PB is pushed, accompanied by an aural warning and visual cue.
Dual control returns when the PB is realeased.
However, if the PB is held down for 40 seconds, the unilateral control becomes permanent, rather than temporary.

OK That sounds more resonable.

I think Ray Ban is confusing a tail plane stall with a normal wing stall.

Brett