Hawg dude gets a second DFC

[Flash]

The lamenting for the A-10 is getting a little bit much nowadays, even surpassing F-14 levels! We can't keep aircraft around forever, if did and kept the birds around that folks still lament we retired our flight decks would still have A-1's, F-8's, F4's (the bent wing kind) and of course F-14's and A-6's too. Of course very few of them would be up because we wouldn't have the AVGAS to fuel the oldest or vacuum tubes to fix the 'newest'. Isn't that the cycle of life though? Naval aviation has survived the Intruder's demise without a replacement, so will the USAF keep trucking along.

As I have said before I think the A-10's time is coming to an end, it is an old bird whose raison d'être has largely disappeared in the current conflicts. In ones where those targets are likely to appear more modern SAMs would likely make things very costly for the planes and their crew, at least more modern tactical aircraft equipped with a whole range of modern weapons would have a better chance at finishing the job and surviving to fight another day.

As a matter of fact I could think of another plane that might have done just as good a job under the same circumstances, maybe even better, that day for the Marines. Just don't tell the Hawg guys though....

 

[Swanee]

The lamenting for the A-10 is getting a little bit much nowadays, even surpassing F-14 levels! we can't keep aircraft around forever, if did and kept the birds around that folks still lament we retired our flight decks would still have A-1's, F-8's, F4's (the bent wing kind) and of course F-14's and A-6's too. Of course very few of them would be up because we wouldn't have the AVGAS to fuel the oldest or vacuum tubes to fix the 'newest'. Isn't that the cycle of life though? Naval aviation has survived the Intruder's demise without a replacement, so will the USAF keep trucking along.

As I have said before I think the A-10's time is coming to an end, it is an old bird whose raison d'être has largely disappeared in the current conflicts. In ones where those targets are likely to appear more modern SAMs would likely make things very costly for the planes and their crew, at least more modern tactical aircraft equipped with a whole range of modern weapons would have a better chance at finishing the job and surviving to fight another day.

As a matter of fact I could think of another plane that might have done just as good a job under the same circumstances, maybe even better, that day for the Marines. Just don't tell the Hawg guys though....

I was just going to mention the A-29. Another bad ass airplane that costs less to operate than the A-10. But again- those SA-XX systems are cheaper and counter those well enough. What's the answer to "high threat" CAS? Is it a manned platform? At some point we're going to have to fight in a place where current guys simply can't go.

 

[nittany03]

What's the answer to "high threat" CAS?

Hint: VAQ is involved. Much to the AF's chagrin.

 

[Flash]

I was just going to mention the A-29. Another bad ass airplane that costs less to operate than the A-10. But again- those SA-XX systems are cheaper and counter those well enough. What's the answer to "high threat" CAS? Is it a manned platform? At some point we're going to have to fight in a place where current guys simply can't go.

Exactly, but they are cheaper and newer than the A-10.

Hint: VAQ is involved. Much to the AF's chagrin.

Stand-off PGMs would help too.

 

[Swanee]

Hint: VAQ is involved. Much to the AF's chagrin.

Much to the chargin of the USMC as well. A group 3 asset won't be able to do the kind of EA/EW that would be required in that environment.

 

[cfam]

Hint: VAQ is involved. Much to the AF's chagrin.

I wouldn't say to their chagrin. I'd say they probably have a better understanding of what we bring to the fight in that role than some Navy guys do.

 

[nittany03]

I wouldn't say to their chagrin. I'd say they probably have a better understanding of what we bring to the fight in that role than some Navy guys do.

Unclass version? Based on the chances I've had to work with them, I question the assumptions on which they base a lot of their SEAD employment as I've seen it. Especially CJs. And how they treat VAQ. I think they needlessly hazard people and aircraft for not as much gain as they'd like to think. But that's just my opinion.

 

[Brett327]

It's worth understanding that USAF SEAD tactics evolved in an environment w/o dedicated AEA, so that drives a lot of what they do. Their organic SEAD players aren't HD/LD, so in the big picture air war, they can assume a bit more risk in their TTPs.

 

[nittany03]

It's worth understanding that USAF SEAD tactics evolved in an environment w/o dedicated AEA, so that drives a lot of what they do. Their organic SEAD players aren't HD/LD, so in the big picture air war, they can assume a bit more risk in their TTPs.

True. IMO, though, they painted themselves into that corner when they made the unforced error of canning the EF-111, and the risks that they're assuming won't give a commensurate return on investment, especially in today's environment. Not being privy to how G tactical employment has evolved beyond the B (not that we could discuss it here in any useful form anyway), I think it might lend itself more towards their mindset. At any rate, on some level, they have to do what they can with the organic assets they have.

 

[busdriver]

True. IMO, though, they painted themselves into that corner when they made the unforced error of canning the EF-111, and the risks that they're assuming won't give a commensurate return on investment, especially in today's environment. Not being privy to how G tactical employment has evolved beyond the B (not that we could discuss it here in any useful form anyway), I think it might lend itself more towards their mindset. At any rate, on some level, they have to do what they can with the organic assets they have.

Giving up organic EA was a horrible decision, but the AF long ago decided to leverage the farm on LO. I'm curious if your assessment of AF accepted risk is based on flying at REDFLAG or Weapons School? Weapons School sorties tend to have artificially high accepted risk based on the goals of the course versus an actual operational planner, almost to the point of stupidity where every mission is no-fail regardless of the actual strategic impact.

 

[nittany03]

Most of what I saw was Weapons School; I'll admit to that. And yes, the ALR seemed absurdly high; I figured there was at least some artificiality involved in it. I'll freely admit I'm also only going from a fleet JO Mission Commander's level of exposure to all topics involved here. My screwed up career timing only offered me that level of exposure before I got bounced. That said, my gut feeling is based on what I saw as some underlying assumptions behind their SEAD doctrine. If we had a SIPR AW, I'm sure the details would be a good discussion up there.

 

[armada1651]

Back to the DFC story, it doesn't seem to me to be about some inherent better capability of the A-10 to get low and slow than the F-18, while there is some truth to their having that capability. Reading the account, it sounds like the Hawgs just managed to get below clouds, because they found a hole that the Rhinos either couldn't find (maybe because it didn't exist at the time they were on station) or weren't willing to go through because of terrain elevation. Regardless, the fact seems to be that the A-10s were flying around lower than the surrounding terrain in order to get beneath the weather, and that's ballsy as fuck in the dark. You could make a strong argument that it's actually just stupid, but you could say the same for many - if not most - actions that result in an award for valor in combat.

As for the comment in the article, is it a shot at the F/A-18 community? Maybe, although I suspect it's meant more for the entire non-Hawg community. But is it unnecessary? I don't think so. It demonstrates that this guy didn't just successfully execute CAS attacks as any aircrew flying in country would be expected to - he did something that flagrantly endangered himself, which other pilots weren't willing to do that night, and as a result, Marines came home alive. Good on him, good on the A-10 community for that mentality, and good on the Air Force for recognizing it. At least that's my take.

 

[MIDNJAC]

Trolling around through the weather looking for a hole at night in Afghanistan is a pretty certain way to kill yourself. I'd imagine he had a pretty good reason to do so, but that sounds like a really bad time, and probably award worthy to me.

 

[STOVLer]

I thought it highly coincidental that the article was released just ahead of this report:

http://www.militarytimes.com/story/...-tops-list-for-friendly-fire-deaths/22949239/

The numbers in the fratricide article have been disputed, but getting a DFC six years later and bloviating about your aircraft's unique CAS capabilities seems like a veiled political defense.

 

[Hair Warrior]

"Two sections of F-18 Super Hornet fighter jets responded to the Marines' request for close-air support but couldn't help them because they would not fly below the clouds covering the mountains below."

Why does the AF constantly have to throw jabs in press releases?

Maybe the AF/PA officer writing the release was trying instead to jab CORONA TOP for their A-10 budget antics...