I am going to come to the discussion a bit late and say that I have to disagree with you. Yes, a new mission set may not be completely understood by someone who got their green ink in a different mission set. However, that person with combat experience understands how to react to new mission demands and even mission subsets that develop over the course of a war. I would go so far as to say those with green ink think on a plane above those without similar experience - as they understand the innate need for precision in planning, risk mitigation, contingency management, ROE, C2 and execution. We try, via the centers of excellence, to create a realistic combat environment - but it is still a simulation.
Tactics change because the enemy gets a vote - not necessarily because we were wrong in the beginning. A person with green ink understands that - Billy Mitchell applying his knowledge in WW1 to future engagements. War is the ultimate innovation lab.
It isn't also what we teach as tactics - it is the faulty assumptions that we make prior to developing tactics about systems that we expect to have online (e.g. Link, GPS, etc.) during a conflict that makes the future dangerous.
I agree with your points with regards to green time. My point was just that because someone has green time in one mission area doesn't instantly confer them expertise in a different mission area. For example, warfare skills garnered in a DAP mission don't necessarily translate to ASW. However, I agree that the non-warfare area specific skills that you mention such as planning, risk management/mitigation, ROE, C2, and execution can easily crosswalk from one mission area to another.
I also agree that a person with green ink would understand the need for tactics to be flexible and responsive vice dogmatic in a real conflict and that this experience would be valuable in analyzing current tactical deficiencies and adjusting our tactics to counter those of an enemy.
That said, the exact experiences of each conflict don't necessarily crosswalk. Billy Mitchell applied lessons learned in WWI to tactical/operational development yet I don't think there were very many instances of heavy bombers sinking enemy ships from high altitude in WWII. Medium bombers operating at low altitude against enemy shipping and light combatants worked far better.
My point was more that a Navy can think it knows how it will fight a war and will think it has enemy capabilities well understood, but that may not always be the case. understanding and countering enemy capabilities requires gathering that information, understanding the capabilities, understanding how it will be employed, etc. Prior to WWII, the USN did not have a good understanding of the capabilities of the IJN's torpedoes. During the first years of the war, the USN had trouble grasping the true capabilities of the Long Lance because USN personnel based their expectations on USN capabilities and doctrine. However, from the start of the war, the USN had a planned counter to torpedoes in the form or radar gunnery. Unfortunately, radar gunnery wasn't fully understood by the fleet and the capability hadn't been fully integrated into doctrine and tactics. Once USN operators understood radar gunnery the IJN advantage in torpedoes was offset by superior USN gunnery. But, throughout the war, USN systems showed themselves to be sensitive and unstable. Shocks from own ship guns or enemy fire often knocked radar systems offline. Once the radar was offline, the USN operators were put at a disadvantage and the IJN ships with their wonderful torpedoes had the upper hand again.
This past example demonstrates your last point that you won't always have all the toys you trained with. Your high tech toys may be unavailable due to being down for maintenance, unable to handle the rigors of combat, or compromised/mitigated by the enemy. Ideally, USN forces need to be able to fight effectively with or without high tech assistance.
Thinking about this response and the WWII discussion, I think one could make a fair argument that the war in the Pacific was NOT waged against a peer competitor. Even early in the war the technological superiority iof the USN fleet was apparent. Once USN technological advantages such as radar gunnery/fire control, search radar, C2, crypto, manufacturing, aircraft, DC, etc were fully integrated in to the fleet the IJN's only hope was luck and human factors (Halsey taking his whole fleet after decoy at Cape Engano).
